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Underpinnings of Positivity Biases in Self-Evaluation 
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Decades of research have demonstrated that people sometimes provide self-
evaluations that emphasize their most flattering qualities. Different theoretical accounts 
have been offered to explain the mechanisms underlying positively-biased self-
evaluation. Some researchers theorize that positively-biased self-evaluations arise from a 
self-protection motivation because positivity biases increase in situations of heightened 
self-esteem threat. Alternative views question whether self-protection motivation is a 
necessary or even dominant source of positivity bias by demonstrating that positively-
biased self-evaluations occur even when threat is not heightened, and that a general 
judgment approach leads to positivity biases in some domains but also to negativity 
biases in other domains. One reason for this gap in knowledge is that behavioral 
measures are limited in their ability to resolve whether the processes underlying 
positively-biased self-evaluation are the same or different depending on contextual 
motivators. Neuroimaging methods are well suited to examine whether different 
mechanisms underlie similar behaviors, specifically similar positively-biased responses 
in different contexts. The four studies presented here explore the neural mechanisms of 
 ix 
positively-biased self-evaluation by first identifying a core set of neural regions 
associated with positivity bias (Study 1A and 1sB), examining whether a heightened self-
protection motivation changes the engagement of those neural systems (Study 2), and 
specifying the precise mechanisms supported by those regions (Study 3). Studies 1A and 
1B revealed evidence for a neural system comprised of medial and lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) and, to a lesser extent dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) that was modulated 
by positivity bias. Study 2 found that a heightened self-protection motivation changes the 
engagement of medial OFC in positively-biased self-evaluation. Finally, Study 3 found 
evidence that medial OFC may support a common mechanism in positively-biased 
judgment that is implemented differently as a function of the motivational context. Taken 
together, these studies represent a first step toward developing a neural model of 
positively-biased self-evaluation. The findings provide some preliminary evidence that 
positivity biases may represent distinct processes in different motivational contexts. This 
dissertation sets the stage for future work to examine how specific positively-biased 
cognitive mechanisms may be supported by specific neural systems and computations as 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the admonition from the Oracle at Delphi to “know thyself,” people’s 
evaluations of themselves are sometimes flawed and in a remarkably systematic manner. 
Specifically, decades of research suggest that people sometimes evaluate themselves in a 
more flattering manner than what external criteria would suggest across a wide variety of 
domains, including their personality characteristics, the knowledge they possess, and 
even their actual behavior (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; 
Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1989; Klayman et al., 1999; Paulhus et al., 2003; 
Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988). One point of debate is whether the 
computational underpinnings of these positivity biases in self-evaluation are the same or 
different as a function of different contextual motivators. The gap in knowledge is 
partially due to the limitations of behavioral measures to resolve whether similar or 
different underlying processes support positively-biased self-evaluations in different 
motivational contexts. The neural level of analysis can provide information about the 
mechanisms that underlie similar positively-biased responses in different motivational 
contexts. This dissertation represents a step away from underspecified behavioral 
comparisons of positively-biased self-evaluations in different contexts by examining the 
neural mechanisms that underlie positively-biased self-evaluations in different 
motivational contexts. 
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Empirical Evidence of Positivity Biases in Self-Evaluation 
One of the most robust examples of positivity biases in self-evaluation is the 
“better than average” effect, that is, the tendency for the majority of people evaluate 
themselves as having more desirable characteristics and fewer undesirable characteristics 
than their average peer (Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; 
Dunning et al., 1989; Moore & Small, 2007; Weinstein, 1980). People also extend these 
better-than-average evaluations to their close others (e.g., romantic partners, best friends), 
but not to their non-close others (e.g., acquaintances, peers)(Brown, 1986; Buunk & Van 
Yperen, 1991; Gagne & Lydon, 2001; Murray & Holmes, 1997; Suls et al., 2002; Van 
Lange & Rusbult, 1995). Although each person may have some unique characteristics, an 
average peer is also likely to have some unique characteristics. Therefore, it is logically 
improbable that the majority of people in a randomly selected sample would be better 
than their average peer across a large number of traits (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; 
Taylor & Brown, 1988). Instead, it would be expected that evaluating the self across a 
large number of traits should be centrally distributed around the average peer (Chambers 
and Windschitl 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Therefore, the tendency for people to 
evaluate themselves as better than their average peer across a large number of traits 
provides compelling evidence that people may have positively-biased views of 
themselves relative to others. These better than average effects are not constrained to 
samples of college students, and predict real-world outcomes across a variety of domains 
(e.g., health, education, business, law, and even college professors: Babcock & 
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Loewenstein, 1977; Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988; Cross, 1977; Dunning, Heath, & 
Suls, 2004; Larwood, 1978; Loftus & Wagenaar, 1988; Odean, 1998; Rutter, Quine, & 
Albery, 1998).  
In addition to providing positively-biased evaluations of their personality 
characteristics, people also tend to claim more knowledge about scholarly concepts than 
they really have in order to appear intelligent (overclaiming bias: Paulhus et al., 2003; 
Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Phillips & Clancy, 1972; Randall & Fernandes, 1991; Stanovich 
& Cunningham, 1992). Research on overclaiming has shown that people tend to inflate 
how much they claim to know about real scholarly concepts, and sometimes even claim 
to know nonexistent information (Paulhus et al., 2003). Research using this task has 
applied signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991) techniques to model people’s tendency to make exaggerated claims of knowledge 
(i.e., decision threshold (c)). From a SDT perspective, decision thresholds provide a 
measure of overclaiming because they are theorized to reflect how strong a sense of 
familiarity is needed in order to claim knowledge. For example, people who are more 
positively-biased tend to claim as much knowledge as possible and may accomplish that 
goal by considering a very weak sense of familiarity as indicative of actual knowledge. 
The people who are most likely to consider a very weak sense of familiarity as indicative 
of actual knowledge when claiming to know scholarly concepts are narcissists and those 
motivated to deceive others into seeing them in a positive light (Bing, Kluemper, 
Davison, Taylor & Novicevic, 2011; Paulhus et al., 2003; Randall & Fernandes, 1991; 
Tracy, Cheng, Robins & Trzesniewski, 2009).  
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Lastly, people also tend to provide positively-biased evaluations of their 
performance and actual behavior. For example, people often report levels of confidence 
in their performance on a variety of tasks (e.g., answering trivia questions, predictions 
about the future, medical and clinical diagnoses) that exceeds their actual task 
performance (overconfidence bias, e.g., Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Fischhoff et al., 1977; 
Klayman et al., 1999; Koriat et al., 1980; Oksam et al., 2000; Oskamp, 1965). In addition, 
people sometimes provide self-evaluations of their actual behavior that are more 
favorable than the evaluations of outside observers (e.g., Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; 
Gosling et al., 1998; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001). For 
example, people remember performing more desirable behaviors during a group 
discussion task than objective observers can later identify (Gosling et al., 1998). 
Moreover, people tend to attribute positive outcomes to the self and dismiss negative 
outcomes to factors outside the self (e.g., Bradley, 1978; Campbell & Sedikides 1999; 
Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Miller & M. Ross, 1975; L. Ross, 1977; Zuckerman, 1979). 
Taken together, research suggests that people tend to provide positively-biased 
evaluations when comparing themselves to their peers, evaluating their scholarly 
knowledge, and evaluating their actual behavior.  
While decades of research have provided evidence that people tend to have 
positively-biased views of themselves and certain other people across a variety of 
domains, it has not answered one essential question: do positivity biases represent a 
single phenomenon or do positivity biases arise from distinct processes in different 
motivational contexts? One point of debate is whether positively-biased judgment arise 
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from a motivation to protect the self, a general judgment strategy that is not tethered to 
self-protection concerns, or both depending on the motivational context (Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Dunning et al., 1989; Kunda, 1990; 
Moore & Small, 2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Different Explanatory Approaches for How Positivity Biases Are 
Accomplished 
SELF-PROTECTION PERSPECTIVE 
Some researchers have proposed that positively-biased self-evaluations are best 
explained by a motivation to protect the self (e.g., Alicke et al., 1995; Dunning, 1995; 
Kunda, 1990; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Swann, 2011; Taylor & Brown, 1988). From a 
self-enhancement perspective, most people are motivated to protect the self and promote 
feelings of self-worth, and partially accomplish that motivation by evaluating their 
personality characteristics, knowledge, and behaviors in self-serving ways (e.g., Taylor & 
Brown, 1988; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Another self-protection perspective suggests 
that people are motivated to protect the consistency of self-views (Swann, 2011). From a 
self-verification perspective, people partially accomplish that motivation by seeking self-
verifying feedback and providing evaluations that are consistent with their firmly-held 
self-views (Kwang & Swann, 2010; Swann, 2011). Both self-protection perspectives 
agree that people with positive self-views are motivated to protect their positively-held 
self-views and therefore evaluate themselves in a positive manner (Kwang & Swann, 
2010; vanDellen et al., 2011). The two perspectives differ in their predictions about 
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individuals with negative self-views. While the self-enhancement perspective predicts 
that individuals with negative self-views will strive for positivity much like individuals 
with positive self-views (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008), the self-
verification perspective predicts that individuals with negative self-views will strive to 
confirm their negative self-views (Kwang & Swann, 2010; Swann, 2011). As most 
people have positive self-views (Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997; Koole et al., 
2001; Twenge & Campbell, 2008) and both perspectives have similar predictions of 
individuals with positive self-views, discussion of the self-protection perspective will 
center on individuals with positive self-views. Support for the self-protection explanation 
comes from two lines of research.  
First, researchers have suggested that positivity biases are elicited by a self-
protection motivation because these evaluations often occur in situations involving 
heightened or explicit threats to the self (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Brown, 2012; Dunning, 
1995; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; vanDellen et al., 2011). For example, when people 
consider certain attributes to be more desirable, important, or related to success, they tend 
to evaluate themselves more favorably on those attributes (Brown, 2012; Dunning, 1995; 
Kunda & Sanitioso, 1990; Miller, 1976; Paulhus et al., 2003; Story, & Dunning, 1998). 
Most people may be motivated to view themselves as being competent, productive and 
capable of attaining positive life outcomes, and may partially accomplish that motivation 
by evaluating themselves favorably on success-related attributes. For example, better than 
average judgments are greater for traits that are considered to be important (Brown, 
2012), and overclaiming is greater for people who are motivated to deceive others into 
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viewing them in a positive light and for narcissistic individuals who have a high need to 
make a good impression on others (Paulhus et al., 2003). Similarly, people tend to recall 
performing behaviors more frequently when the behaviors are described as being 
predictive of success and other desirable outcomes (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Sanitioso, 
Kunda, & Fong, 1990; Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981). People are also more 
enthusiastic about receiving feedback on important attributes, but only if they believe (or 
are led to believe) that they possess those important attributes (Dunning, 1995). 
Admitting to shortcomings on success-related attributes has the potential to threaten the 
self and undermine a self-protection goal.  
In fact, explicit threats to the self have been shown to increase positively-biased 
self-evaluations, presumably as a way to compensate for the threat and protect self-worth 
(Brown, 2012; Dunning & Beauregard, 2000; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; vanDellen et 
al., 2011). Threat refers to negative feedback about personality, academic competence, 
social skills, or interpersonal relationships that challenges favorable self-views 
(Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; Leary et al., 1998, 2009; vanDellen et al., 2011). 
Threats to the self tend to decrease self-esteem and therefore motivate people to 
compensate for the threat in a variety of ways (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Crocker & 
Park, 2004; Leary et al., 1998; vanDellen et al., 2011). For example, explicit threats 
increase the extent to which people view themselves as better than their average peer 
(Beer, Chester, & Hughes, forthcoming; Brown, 2012; Vohs & Heatherton, 2004), 
downplay their negative qualities and exaggerate their positive qualities (Baumeister & 
Jones, 1978; Brown & Smart, 1991; Greenberg & Pyszczynksi, 1985; Schneider, 1969), 
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take personal credit for successes while attributing failures to factors outside the self 
(Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Shrauger & Lund, 1975), report 
more optimism and self-confidence about their ability to succeed in the future (McFarlin 
& Blascovitch, 1981; Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992),  and shift attention to positive 
characteristics and core values (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Dodgson & Wood, 
1998; Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). Therefore, 
explicit threats to the self may engage a strong motivation to protect the self and bring 
about positively-biased self-evaluations to compensate for the threat.  
Another reason researchers have suggested that positivity biases arise from a self-
protection motivation is because preemptively bolstering the self by affirming core values 
and important aspects of the self reduces positively-biased self-evaluations. Research 
suggests that self-affirmation may temporarily satisfy a motivation to protect the self 
(Crocker & Park, 2004; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 2000). Self-
affirmation does not necessarily resolve the initial threat but rather bolsters the self by 
refocusing attention to valued aspects of the self. Preemptively bolstering the self through 
self-affirmation has been shown to reduce the tendency for people to exaggerate their 
performance (Gramzow & Willard, 2006), the tendency for people to reject critical 
feedback (Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Sherman, Nelson, & 
Steele, 2000), and the tendency for people to boost their positivity by making downward 
social comparisons (e.g., comparing the self to incompetent others)(Fein & Spencer, 
1997; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001). Taken together, research suggests that positivity 
biases in self-evaluations may arise from a motivation to protect the self because these 
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evaluations are increased in situations of heightened or explicit threat and reduced when 
self-affirmation preemptively bolsters the self from threat. 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
While the bulk of research has typically offered a self-protective motivation to 
explain positivity biases in self-evaluations, an alternative perspective has recently 
suggested that there are reasons for looking beyond a strictly self-protective explanation 
to consider alternative or parallel explanations. Researchers first challenged a self-
protection explanation by pointing out the lack of consistent support for the effect of 
threat on one robust and commonly used indicator of positivity bias, namely, the better-
than-average effect (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). Alternative views argued that if 
better-than-average judgments were best explained by a self-protection motivation, then 
explicit threats to the self should increase better-than-average judgments. However, a few 
recent studies have since demonstrated that explicit threats do elicit increased better-than-
average judgments (Beer, Chester, Hughes, forthcoming; Brown, 2012; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2004). While recent studies provide evidence against the first challenge to a 
self-protection explanation, other challenges remain.  
One reason for looking beyond a strictly self-protective explanation of positivity 
bias is that people tend to make positively-biased self-evaluations even when threat is not 
heightened or made salient (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Klayman et al., 1999; 
Metcalfe, 1988; Moore & Small, 2007). For example, previous research shows that 
manipulating factors other than explicit threat, such as the breadth of a trait’s construal, 
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reduces positively-biased self-evaluations (Dunning et al., 1989). Trait breadth refers to 
the diversity or number of behaviors that define a trait (Buss & Craik, 1983; Hampson, 
John, & Goldberg, 1986). For example, narrowly-construed traits such as ‘tidiness’ 
restrict the range of behaviors that can be easily associated with the self compared to 
broadly-construed traits such as ‘talent’ that have a much wider range of behaviors that 
can be associated with the self. People’s positively-biased tendency to claim that they 
have more desirable personalities than their peers is attenuated when the comparisons are 
made for narrowly construed traits that restrict the information relevant to a judgment 
compared to broadly-construed traits (Dunning et al., 1989; and for evaluations of 
romantic partners: Neff & Karney, 2002, 2005). In addition, people tend to be 
overconfident about their knowledge in certain domains (e.g., temperatures in foreign 
cities) but not about their knowledge in other domains (e.g., poverty levels in US states) 
(Klayman et al., 1999). It is unlikely that a lack of knowledge of temperature information 
is more threatening than a lack of knowledge of poverty information (Klayman et al., 
1999), which lends support to the notion that other, non-self-protective explanations may 
be sufficient to explain positivity biases in self-evaluation.  
Second, research suggests that people do not always provide positively-biased 
self-evaluations. For example, people do not provide positively-biased responses in 
certain domains, such as evaluations of their social status (Anderson et al., 2006). In 
addition, people sometimes provide negatively-biased self-evaluations (Blanton et al., 
2001; Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Kruger, 1999; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; 
Moore & Small, 2007). For example, people evaluate themselves to be worse than other 
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people at juggling, writing computer code, or coping with the death of a loved one. 
Moreover, people believe they are less likely than other people at living past age 100, 
graduating in the top 1% of their class, or owning an airplane. These negatively-biased 
self-evaluations share a common feature, namely, that they occur in domains in which 
success is rare, even though these rare abilities are no less socially desirable or important 
than more common abilities that tend to be characterized by positivity biases. These 
findings seem incongruent with a self-protection account, and raise the possibility that 
self-protection may not be a necessary or dominant explanation for positively-biased self-
evaluation and point to alternative or parallel explanations that may sufficiently account 
for positively-biased self-evaluations. 
Alternative views propose that aspects of the judgment stimuli and a reliance on 
general judgment approaches that are not tied to self-protection concerns may be 
sufficient causes of positivity bias (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Metcalfe, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Ross & Sicoly, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In particular, alternative views address the 
challenges raised against a self-protection explanation by demonstrating that general 
judgment processes that are not tethered to self-protection motivation may lead to 
positively-biased responses in some situations and to a reduction in positively-biased 
responses or even negativity biases in other situations (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; 
Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Kruger, 1999; Moore & Small, 2007). While alternative 
views may provide a sufficient explanation for why a common mechanism elicits 
positivity biases and negativity biases, another possibility is that both perspectives are 
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correct in different motivational contexts. As mentioned above, a reliance on general 
judgment approaches is not a surefire way to protect the self from explicit threat because 
these approaches also lead to negativity bias, which would undermine a self-protection 
goal. Therefore, threat may engage a distinct process that is more likely to be successful 
at eliciting positively-biased self-evaluations. 
What Can Neuroimaging Tell Us About How Positivity Biases Occur? 
Why is there a gap in our knowledge about whether positivity biases reflect a 
single phenomenon or different phenomena as a function of whether threat is explicitly 
heightened? One reason is because behavioral measures alone are limited in their ability 
to resolve questions about the processes that underlie similar behaviors as a function of 
different motivations or contexts. For example, it is difficult to adjudicate with behavioral 
indices whether positively-biased self-evaluations reflect a self-protection motivation, a 
parallel or independent judgment strategy, or both, because the behavioral indices (i.e., 
positively-biased responses) are similar across threatening and not explicitly threatening 
contexts. Although behavioral research has identified a number of variables that moderate 
positivity biases, these moderator variables can often be explained from both a self-
protection and a non-self-protection perspective. Therefore, the mechanisms that underlie 
positively-biased self-evaluations in different motivational contexts are underspecified. 
One way to begin to understand whether positively-biased self-evaluations 
represent a single phenomenon or whether positively-biased self-evaluations arise from 
self-protective processes and more generalized judgment strategies as a function of 
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contextual motivators is to examine their underlying patterns of neural activation. In 
particular, neuroimaging methods are well suited to answer questions about how different 
psychological phenomena are implemented in the brain, which can inform our 
understanding of the processes underlying those psychological phenomena (Cacioppo & 
Bernston, 1992; Henson, 2006; Kosslyn, 1999; Mitchell, 2006; Ochsner & Lieberman, 
2001; Posner & DiGirolamo, 2000). For example, identifying the neural systems that 
underlie positively-biased self-evaluations is useful because we can then examine how 
the engagement of those neural systems is influenced by the presence of a heightened 
self-protection motivation elicited by an explicit threat. If a self-protection motivation 
elicited by explicit threat changes the engagement of the neural systems related to 
positively-biased evaluations or engage additional neural regions, this might suggest that 
positively-biased evaluations may represent distinct phenomena as a function of 
contextual motivators. On the other hand, if a self-protection motivation elicited by 
explicit threat does not affect the neural systems associated with positively-biased 
evaluation, this might suggest that positivity biases represent a unitary phenomenon 
across different contexts. However, it can be problematic to rely too heavily on reverse 
inference to interpret whether the similar or distinct patterns of neural activation support 
similar or distinct psychological mechanisms. Therefore, identifying the precise 
mechanisms supported by the neural regions involved in positively-biased evaluation 
may provide a deeper understanding of how positively-biased evaluations are 
accomplished in different motivational contexts.  In sum, examining positivity biases 
from a behavioral and neural level of analysis may have important implications for 
 14 
understanding whether positivity biases reflect a self-protection motivation, a generalized 
judgment approach, or both. However, current neural research has not yet examined 
positivity biases in self-evaluation from a neural level of analysis (Beer, 2007). 
Overview of the Studies 
This dissertation represents a step toward answering how positivity biases are 
accomplished in different motivational contexts by examining the neural mechanisms that 
underpin them. In order to gain traction on this question, the four studies presented here 
all combine neuroimaging methods (fMRI) and established behavioral paradigms drawn 
from the social psychological literature on positivity biases in self-evaluation. The four 
studies take a step away from underspecified behavioral comparisons of positively-biased 
evaluations in different contexts to attempt to specify the mechanisms that underlie them. 
To this end, the specific aims of this research program are to first identify a core set of 
neural regions that is associated with positively-biased evaluation (Studies 1A and 1B), 
then build upon these initial findings to examine how the engagement of this core set of 
neural regions changes when self-protection is heightened by explicit threat (Study 2), 
and finally to examine what precise psychological processes are instantiated in the neural 
regions associated with positively-biased judgment (Study 3).  
The first aim addresses a gap in existing neural research on self-evaluation by 
identifying a core set of neural regions that is associated with positively-biased jdugment. 
Although existing neural research on self-evaluation has identified neural regions 
involved in self-judgments as compared to judgments about other people and inanimate 
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objects (for reviews, see Amodio & Frith, 2006; Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Mitchell, 2009; 
Ochsner et al., 2005), it has not addressed the neural regions associated with the 
systematic positivity biases that sometimes affect self-evaluation and social cognition 
(Beer, 2007). In order to begin to address whether positivity biases represent a unitary 
phenomenon or multiple distinct phenomena in different motivational contexts, research 
is needed that first identifies a core set of neural regions associated with positively-biased 
evaluations. Study 1A examined the neurobiology of one robust and commonly used 
indicator of positivity bias, namely, the better-than-average effect. Trait breadth was 
manipulated in order to generate variance in positively-biased evaluations and identify 
neural systems associated with increased susceptibility to positivity bias. Study 1B sought 
to decouple better-than-average judgments from the trait breadth manipulation in order to 
provide converging evidence for the neural systems associated with positively-biased 
evaluation. For example, neural activation associated with positively-biased self-
evaluation in Study 1A may be driven by susceptibility to better-than-average judgments 
as a function of trait breadth, but neural activation may also be driven by properties of the 
judgment stimuli (i.e., specificity of trait words). Therefore, Study 1B examined the 
neural activation associated with evaluations of social targets (close others, non-close 
others) that differ in their tendency to exhibit better than average responses as a function 
of trait breadth (Neff & Karney, 2002, 2005; Suls et al., 2002; Taylor & Koivumaki, 
1976). 
The second aim is to examine whether a heightened self-protection motivation 
changes the engagement of the neural systems associated with positively-biased self-
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evaluation. Existing research has not yet examined whether explicit threat affects the 
neural systems associated with positively-biased self-evaluation, or whether explicit 
threat engages additional neural systems to compensate for threat. Therefore, it remains 
unknown whether positivity biases in self-evaluation when threat is explicitly heightened 
draws on similar or distinct neural mechanisms as positively-biased self-evaluations 
when threat is not explicitly heightened. Study 2 addresses this question by examining the 
patterns of neural activation associated with positively-biased self-evaluation elicited by 
an explicit threat. In Study 2, positivity bias was measured using the same approach as 
Studies 1A and 1B (“better-than-average” judgments) to maximize comparability 
between results, but elicited positivity bias in self-evaluation with an explicit threat 
manipulation.  
The third aim is to begin to understand the psychological processes that are 
supported by neural regions associated with positively-biased evaluation. While the first 
and second aims seek to identify a set of neural regions that are associated with 
positively-biased evaluation and how the engagement of this set of regions is affected by 
self-protection motivation, they do not provide information about the precise mechanisms 
supported by those regions. Elucidating the mechanisms that are supported by neural 
regions associated with positively-biased evaluation may lead to a deeper understanding 
of whether positivity biases represent a single phenomenon or multiple phenomena as a 
function of the motivational context. Study 3 takes a step towards addressing this 
question by combining a signal detection approach and a contextual manipulation that 
permits the measurement of a process that influences the expression of positively-biased 
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evaluation in different contexts. Specifically, Study 3 directly tests whether neural 
activation associated with positivity bias tracks shifts in decision thresholds that influence 
the expression of positively-biased responses as a function of the motivational context. 
 Taken together, this dissertation has the potential to begin to uncover whether 
positivity biases represent a unitary phenomenon or multiple distinct phenomena by 
expanding our understanding of the neurobiology of the positivity biases that sometimes 
characterize self-evaluation. It is our goal that this line of research will motivate future 
work that can test how specific mechanisms may be instantiated in the neural systems 
associated with positivity bias. 
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Study 1A takes a first step towards identifying a core set of neural regions that is 
associated with positively-biased self-evaluations. Current neural research on self-
evaluation has focused on the self-referent effect in memory by comparing neural regions 
that differentiate self-judgments of personality traits from judgments about personality 
traits of other people or inanimate objects (for reviews, see Amodio & Frith, 2006; 
Mitchell, 2009; Ochsner et al., 2005; Uddin et al., 2007). Taken together, these studies 
find that judging the personality traits of the self are robustly associated with medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) function. However, 
existing neural studies do not take into account the ways in which people’s self-
representations tend to be positively-biased. Therefore, more research is needed to 
identify the neural systems that underlie positivity bias in self-evaluation.  
Study 1A examined the neural systems underlying positively-biased self-
evaluation by examining a robust and commonly used indicator of positivity bias, 
namely, the tendency for people to evaluate their personalities more favorably than the 
personality of their average peer (i.e., the “better-than-average” effect). Trait breadth was 
manipulated in order to create variance in the extent to which social comparisons are 
positively-biased (Dunning et al., 1989; also see Buss & Craik 1983; Hampson, John, & 
Goldberg, 1986). As mentioned above, the tendency to claim more desirable personalities 
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than the average peer is attenuated when the comparisons are made for narrowly 
construed traits (e.g., ‘tidy’) that restrict the range of behaviors that can be associated 
with a trait as compared to broadly construed traits (e.g., ‘talented’)(Dunning, 
Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). Therefore, neural regions that are modulated by better-
than-average responses should differentiate judgments of broadly construed traits that 
tend to be more positively-biased from judgments of narrowly construed traits that tend 
to be less positively-biased. Results of this study are also reported in a published 
manuscript (Beer & Hughes, 2010). 
METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty right-handed participants (9 female, M age = 20.7 years, SD = 1.9 years) 
were recruited in compliance with the human subjects regulations of the University of 
Texas at Austin and were compensated $15/hour or course credit for their participation. 
All participants were native English speakers and screened for medications or 
psychological and/or neurological conditions that might influence the measurement of 
cerebral blood flow. 
Task 
Participants completed a modified version of a social comparative task used in 
previous research (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). To ensure that there was a 
comparable “average peer” across our sample, participants were all students at the 
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University of Texas at Austin and judged their personality characteristics in relation to 
the average University of Texas student of their same gender and age (Chambers & 
Windschitl, 2004). In each trial, participants rated how they compared on a personality 
trait using a 5-point scale (-2=Much less than the average UT student; 0=About the same 
as the average UT student; 2=Much more than the average UT student). After each 
judgment, a screen depicting a fixation point indicated that participants should clear their 
minds (screens were jittered with lengths of 2 s (50%), 4 s (25%), or 6 s (25%) to 
maximize independence across experimental conditions: Donaldson, Peterson, Ollinger, 
& Buckner, 2001). 
Participants completed 50 randomly intermixed trials of each of the Positive-
Specific, Positive-Broad, Negative-Specific, and Negative-Broad conditions equally 
divided across 2 runs lasting 9 minutes and 10 seconds. Stimuli were projected onto a 
screen mounted on the bed of the scanner. Participants’ head motion was limited using 
foam padding. Stimulus presentation and response collection was controlled by the 
program E-prime running on a Windows 98 Computer. 
Stimuli 
Trait words were equally distributed across Valence and trait Breadth. Stimuli 
were selected from trait word lists which have been standardized for valence, breadth, 
familiarity, and number of syllables (Anderson, 1968; Kirby & Gardener, 1972) and used 
in many previous behavioral and neural studies of self-processing (Alicke, 1985; 
Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Kelley et al., 2002; Moran et al., 2006; 
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Ochsner et al., 2005). To ensure that this information was not outdated, a sample of 10 
student judges who would be representative of our fMRI study population rated 250 
words for valence (i.e., social desirability), trait breadth, familiarity, and judgment 
certainty. Ratings were consistent with standardized information (Anderson, 1968; Kirby 
and Gardener, 1972). The 200 words used for the experiments were selected using 
several constraints. Words that were not familiar to at least one of our judges were 
eliminated. Four sets of 50 words based on the published norms and our student judges 
were equated for (a) social desirability within valence level (e.g., positivity of positive-
broad vs positive-specific traits, negativity of negative-broad vs negative-specific traits, p 
> .05) and (b) judgment certainty (p > .05) but (c) differed in trait breadth (positive-broad 
vs positive-specific, t = 11.4, p < .05; negative-broad vs negative-specific, t = 26.7, p < 
.05). These criteria ensured that traits differed in their breadth but not in additional factors 
such as familiarity, social desirability, or self-descriptiveness (measured by certainty: 
Sedikides, 1993; 1995). 
The Positive-Specific condition consisted of trait words such as prompt, talkative, 
tactful, coolheaded, mathematical, well spoken, witty, modest, energetic, and 
lighthearted. The Positive-Broad condition consisted of trait words such as likable, 
mature, decent, positive, capable, understanding, educated, competent, disciplined, and 
ethical. The Negative-Specific condition consisted of trait words such as stingy, 
materialistic, bashful, high strung, rigid, gullible, timid, jumpy, boastful, and messy. The 
Negative-Broad condition consisted of trait words such as lacking, bad, weak, 
maladjusted, irritating, unreliable, phony, narrow minded, aggressive, and showy. 
 22 
FMRI Data Acquisition 
All images were collected on a 3.0-T GE Signa EXCITE scanner at the University 
of Texas at Austin Imaging Research Center. Functional images were acquired with a 
GRAPPA sequence (TR = 2000ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV=240, voxel size 2.5 mm x 2.5 mm 
x 3 mm) with each volume consisting of 35 axial slices in line with the AC-PC line. 
These parameters were implemented to optimize coverage of the orbitofrontal cortex 
without sacrificing whole-brain acquisition. A high resolution SPGR T1-weighted image 
was also acquired from each subject so that functional data could be normalized to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas space. 
FMRI Data Analysis 
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology). Functional images were reconstructed from k-space using a linear 
time-interpolation algorithm to double the effective sampling rate. Image volumes were 
corrected for slice-timing skew using temporal sinc-interpolation and for movement using 
rigid-body transformation parameters. Structural and functional volumes were 
normalized to T1 and EPI templates, respectively, using a 12-parameter affine 
transformation together with a nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis functions 
that resampled the volumes to 2-mm cubic voxels. Images were then smoothed with an 8-
mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. To remove drifts within sessions, a high-pass filter with a 
cutoff period of 128 seconds was applied. 
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A fixed-effects analysis modeled event-related responses for each participant. 
Responses related to judgment in the Positive-Specific, Positive-Broad, Negative-
Specific, and Negative-Broad conditions were modeled as events using a canonical 
hemodynamic response function with a temporal derivative. A general linear model 
analysis created contrast images for each participant summarizing differences of interest. 
Contrasts from each participant were used in a second-level analysis treating participants 
as a random effect. Group average SPM{t} maps were created for contrasts of interest 
(Specific > Broad; Broad > Specific). 
Interpretation of results from main contrasts was limited to regions that had 
previously been associated with self-referential processing, valence, availability 
heuristics, and emotional reappraisal (e.g., Beer, in press; Ochsner et al., 2005; 
DeMartino et al., 2006; Krusemark, Campbell & Clementz, 2008; Moran et al., 2006; 
Sharot et al., 2007a). Contrasts of interest were masked by a priori neuroanatomical VOIs 
from the Automated Anatomical Labeling map (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and 
activation clusters that survived correction for multiple comparisons (P < .05 familywise 
error (FWE), k=10) were reported (search volumes: lateral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC: 
23-mm3), medial orbitofrontal cortex (MOFC: 17-mm3), MPFC (19-mm3), ventral 
anterior cingulate cortex (vACC: 22- mm3), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC: 22-
mm3), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC: 15-mm3), and insula (25-mm3). Parameter 
estimates (i.e., beta weights) were extracted from significant clusters using Marsbar 
(Brett et al., 2002). The parameter estimates represent the regression coefficients from the 
main contrasts in the general linear model predicting MR signal. 
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Multiple regression tested whether individual differences in ratings in the Specific 
and Broad trait conditions predicted neural differentiation in the Specific > Broad 
contrast (ratings Positive Specific and Positive Broad, r = .81, p < .05; ratings Negative 
Specific and Negative Broad, r = .86, p < .05). Ratings for Negative traits were reverse-
scored so they could be collapsed with ratings of Positive traits to reflect average 
deviation from the average peer. Results from the regression analyses were corrected for 
multiple comparison at p < .05 FWE based on the activation clusters from the group 
contrasts of the Specific > Broad contrast (8-mm3 volume around main effect peaks). 
RESULTS 
Task Performance 
No gender differences were found in responses or reaction times (Fs < 1) so 
results are reported collapsed across gender. Consistent with previous behavioral research 
(Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg, 1989), self-evaluations were characterized by a 
significant interaction between the Valence (Positive, Negative) and Breadth (Broad, 
Specific) factors (F(1, 19) = 108.75, p < .05; Figure 1) that qualified a main effect of 
Valence (F(1, 19) = 74.80, p < .05). In comparison to the average peer, participants on 
average viewed themselves as significantly more likely to have the Positive-Broad traits 
(t(19) = 5.45, p <.05) and significantly less likely to have Negative-Broad traits (t(19) = -
7.94, p <.05) when compared to their respective Specific conditions. Participants did not 
just claim positive traits and downplay negative traits; they tended to view themselves as 
most distinct for positive and negative words for traits with broader construals. 
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Participants’ reaction times were characterized by main effects of Valence 
(F(1,19) = 15.4, p < .05) and Breadth (F(1,19) = 10.0, p < .05) but their interaction did 
not reach significance (F(1,19) = 2.6, p > .05). Judgments in the Positive condition (M = 
1426.62 ms, SE = 25.9) were made more quickly than judgments in the Negative 
condition (M = 1466.21 ms, SE = 22.8). Judgments in the Broad condition (M = 1432.58 
ms, SE = 25.6) were made more quickly than judgments in the Specific condition (M = 
1460.25 ms, SE = 23.1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Behavioral results for social comparison evaluations for self  
Means and standard errors of Self-evaluations of positive and negative traits in 
comparison to an average peer. On average, the sample should estimate their traits at the 
midpoint of the scale (‘‘0’’) for unbiased evaluations. 
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FMRI Results 
MPFC, OFC, and dACC are Associated with Social-Comparative Judgments of 
Specific vs Broad Traits 
A direct comparison between the Specific condition and the Broad condition was 
used to examine neural regions associated with susceptibility to “above average” 
judgments. In contrast to the Broad trait condition, judgments of Specific traits were 
associated with greater activation in MPFC (peaks = Brodmann’s Area (BA) 10: 8, 64, 
24, and BA 9 = 12, 54, 34). Additionally, the Specific > Broad contrast revealed 
significant activation in medial OFC (BA 11 peaks = -4, 46, -10, and -2, 56, -14), lateral 
OFC (left BA 47 peak = -32, 34, -14, right BA 47 peak = 28, 28, -20) and dACC (BA 24 
peak = 10, 26, 34)(See Figure 2A-B). No significant activation was found for the main 
contrast of Broad > Specific.  
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Figure 2: Neural regions associated with reduced better-than-average responses for self  
A: Parameter estimates for the Specific > Broad contrast. “*” indicate significant 
differences. B: Neural activation associated with main effect and the overlap of the 
regression analysis for Specific > Broad contrast: mOFC: y =46; lOFC: y = 34; dACC: x 
= 10. C: Scatter plots depict the regression analysis of individual differences in social-
comparative ratings on neural activation. 
 
 
OFC and dACC are Negatively Modulated by Individual Differences in “Better 
Than Average” Judgments 
 Neural regions that differentiate the Specific and Broad conditions have two 
possible interpretations: they might be related to the differences in social-comparative 
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judgments or they might be related to the fact that participants were processing relatively 
specific or broad traits irrespective of social-comparative judgments. Therefore, we 
conducted a regression analyses to examine whether the neural activation associated with 
the Specific > Broad contrast was driven by individuals who tended to rate themselves as 
more similar to the average peer. The more participants viewed themselves like their 
average peer in the Specific condition, the more they recruited regions of the OFC and 
dACC activation identified in the main contrast of Specific > Broad (see Figure 2B-C). 
Individual differences in “better than average” judgments were negatively correlated with 
activation in medial OFC (regression peak = -6, 46, -10; t = 2.96, p < .05 FWE) and left 
lateral OFC (regression peak = -34, 34, -16; t = 2.83, p < .05 FWE). Similarly, there was 
a trend for negative correlation between individual differences in “above average” 
judgments and dACC activation (regression peak = 10, 26, 32; t = 2.51, p = .07 FWE). 
DISCUSSION 
Study 1A represents a first step toward identifying a core set of neural regions that 
is associated with positively-biased self-evaluation. While existing neural research finds a 
robust association between MPFC function and self-evaluation, it does not address the 
neural systems that are associated with the tendency for self-evaluations to be positively-
biased. The current study builds on previous neural research examining self-judgments of 
personality traits by examining the tendency for people to evaluate their personality traits 
more favorably in comparison to their average peer. Consistent with previous behavioral 
research, participants evaluated their personality traits as better than the personality of 
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their average peer; this tendency was reduced for evaluations of specific traits that are 
characterized by a more restricted range of behaviors that are associated with a trait as 
compared to broad traits. The MPFC, a region often associated with self-evaluation, 
showed significantly increased activation for judgments of specific traits as compared to 
broad traits. However, the MPFC region was not modulated by individual differences in 
better-than-average responses. OFC and dACC were also significantly more activated for 
judgments of specific traits compared to broad traits. Unlike the MPFC, activity in medial 
and lateral OFC and, to a lesser extent, dACC was negatively modulated by individual 
differences in better-than-average responses. The more participants recruited OFC and, to 
a lesser extent, dACC activation, the less they evaluated themselves as better than their 
average peer. The present findings provide new evidence for a core set of neural regions 
associated with positivity biases in self-evaluation. 
The findings extend and contribute to a large body of research on the neural 
systems involved in self-evaluation. As mentioned above, current neural research on self-
evaluation have identified MPFC and PCC as important regions for evaluating the self as 
compared to non-social stimuli (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; 
Ochsner et al., 2005; Uddin et al., 2007), but existing research had not yet considered the 
biases that sometimes pervade self-evaluation. The findings from Study 1A suggest that 
discussions about the neural systems of self-evaluation should be expanded to include a 
role for OFC and dACC in biased self-evaluation. 
While the results from the present study suggest that reduced OFC and dACC 
activation may be associated with positively-biased evaluations, more research is needed 
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to more deeply understand the set of neural regions associated with positively-biased 
evaluation. In the present study, trait breadth was manipulated in order to create variance 
in the extent to which evaluations were positively-biased. The association between OFC 
and dACC function and reduced positivity bias was drawn from a contrast of neural 
activity during the specific trait condition associated with reduced positivity bias 
compared to neural activity in the broad trait condition associated with positivity bias. 
Therefore, OFC and dACC activation may be associated with positivity bias, but OFC 
and dACC activation may be related to other factors, such as differences in the stimulus 
properties themselves (e.g., specificity of the trait words). The individual difference 
analysis provides evidence against this interpretation, suggesting that the most likely 
explanation is that OFC and dACC activation are involved in reduced better-than-average 
ratings. In addition, the present results are consistent with research showing that patients 
with OFC damage tend to evaluate their social behavior more favorably than the 
evaluations of trained judges (Beer et al., 2006). Additionally, source localization 
analyses from an ERP study suggest that dACC activation may be associated with non-
self-serving attributions of success on a working memory task (Krusemark, Campbell, & 
Clementz, 2008), Lastly, OFC has been shown to attenuate biases in non-social 
judgments (De Martino et al., 2006). However, research that decouples better-than-
average responses from the trait breadth manipulation is needed to more deeply 




The aim of Study 1B is to provide converging evidence for the neural systems 
associated with positively-biased evaluation. Study 1A suggested an association between 
OFC and dACC activation and reduced better-than-average responses as a function of 
trait breadth (Beer & Hughes 2010). However, OFC and dACC activation may have also 
been related to properties of the judgment stimuli (i.e., specificity of trait words). 
Therefore, the goal of Study 1B is to decouple better-than-average responses from the 
trait breadth manipulation in order to better understand the neural association of 
positively-biased evaluation.  
To this end, Study 1B examines the neural systems associated with evaluations of 
social targets (Close Other, Non-Close Other) that differ in their susceptibility to better-
than-average responses elicited by trait breadth (Neff & Karney, 2002, 2005; Suls et al., 
2002). Previous research has shown that evaluations of Close Others tend to be better-
than-average for broad traits, whereas evaluations of Close Others for specific traits and 
evaluations of Non-Close Others for all traits tend to be more similar to the average peer 
(Neff & Karney, 2002, 2005; Suls et al., 2002). Therefore, if OFC and dACC activation 
are associated with reduced positively-biased social comparisons and not to aspects of the 
judgment stimuli, then OFC and dACC activation should be greater for judgments of 
Close Other’s Specific traits and all Non-Close Other’s traits, as compared to Close 
Other’s Broad traits. Finally, individual differences in the degree to which people 
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evaluate their Close Others and Non-Close Others as better-than-average should be 
negatively correlated with OFC and dACC activity. However, if OFC and dACC are 
related to properties of the judgment stimuli, then these regions should also differentiate 
Specific from Broad traits for Non-Close Others despite no differences in better-than-
average judgments between Non-Close Other Specific and Broad traits. Results of this 
study are also reported in a published manuscript (Hughes & Beer, in press-a). 
METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty right-handed participants (15 females, M age = 18.7 years, SD = 0.8 
years) were recruited in compliance with the human subjects regulations of the University 
of Texas at Austin and compensated with $15/h or course credit. All participants were 
native English speakers and free from medications or psychological and/or neurological 
conditions that might influence the measurement of cerebral blood flow. In addition, all 
participants were prescreened to ensure that each had a romantic partner and a roommate. 
Participants with more than 1 roommate were instructed to select one of them for the 
purpose of the study. Participants whose roommates were biologically related to them 
(i.e., siblings, cousins, etc.) were excluded from participation. 
Task 
Participants completed a modified version of a social comparison task used in 
Study 1A and previous research (Dunning et al., 1989; Beer & Hughes, 2010). In the 
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task, participants compared the personality traits of a Close Other (i.e., their romantic 
partner) and a Non-Close Other (i.e., their roommate) with the personality traits of an 
average peer of their same age and gender at their university (see Figure 3). Comparisons 
were made in relation to an average peer of the same age and gender as the Close Other 
and Non-Close Other to ensure that there was a comparable ‘‘average peer’’ across our 
sample. Participants were presented with personality trait words and had to make 
comparisons for Close Others and Non-Close Others (see Figure 3) using a 5-point scale 
(–2 = much less than the average UT student; –1 = slightly less than the average UT 
student; 0 = about the same as the average UT student; 1 = slightly more than the average 
UT student; 2 = much more than the average UT student). 
Following previous research on social cognition (e.g., Kelley et al. 2002; Ochsner 
et al. 2005), we used 2 different cues to remind participants which Target (Close Other, 
Non-Close Other) they were comparing with an average peer. First, participants were 
presented with a 2 s instruction screen that indicated the Target for comparison (Close 
Other, Non-Close Other) (see Figure 3). Second, each instruction screen was followed by 
a set of probes from the social comparison task for that Target. Each probe reminded the 
participants what Target was of interest and indicated the personality trait word of 
interest (see Figure 3). Within a set of probes, personality trait words were 1) randomly 
sampled from 4 trait categories described below (see Stimuli) and 2) jittered with screens 
depicting a fixation point. Participants were instructed to clear their minds when they saw 
a screen with a fixation point. These fixation screens were randomly jittered (2 s [50%], 4 
s [25%], 6 s [25%]) to maximize independence across experimental  (Donaldson et al., 
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2001). This approach provides strong reminders of the Target of interest and allows 
independent modeling of the neural activation for each social comparison rating. 
 
Figure 3: Stimuli and timing in social-comparative judgment task  
Participants saw an instruction screen that indicated the Target (‘‘Romantic Partner’’ or 
‘‘Roommate’’) of judgment. The instruction screen was separated from a subsequent set 
of social comparison probes with a jittered screen depicting a fixation point. Within a set 
of probes, personality trait words were jittered with screens depicting a fixation point. 
 
FMRI data were collected while participants performed 4 functional runs of the 
social comparison task described above. Each functional run lasted 10 min 4 s. Within a 
run, participants rated 4 sets of probes for each of the Close Other and Non-Close Other 
condition. The presentation order of the probe sets was randomly assigned within a run. 
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In order to present the 200 traits words (50 words each for 4 categories, see Stimuli 
below) for each Target across 4 runs which were each divided into 4 sets of probes, it was 
necessary to have 50% of the probe sets include 12 probes and the other 50% include 13 
probes (e.g., 200/16 = 12.5). Stimuli were projected onto a screen mounted on the bed of 
the scanner and head motion was limited using foam padding. Stimulus presentation and 
response collection was controlled by the program E-prime running on a Windows XP 
Computer. 
After leaving the scanner, participants rated each Target on Duration of 
Relationship (‘‘How long have you known your roommate/romantic partner (in 
months)?’’), Liking (‘‘How much do you like your roommate/romantic partner?’’), 
Similarity (‘‘How similar do you consider yourself to your roommate/romantic 
partner?’’), and Close- ness (‘‘How close are you to your roommate/romantic partner?’’) 
on a 5- point scale (descriptive anchors were provided for 3 points: 1 = not very much; 3 
= somewhat; 5 = very much; points 2 and 4 reflected the continuum between the extreme 
endpoints and midpoint). Liking, Similarity, and Closeness for Non-Close Others were all 
highly correlated (all r s > 0.65, P < 0.05). Therefore, a composite score ‘‘Intimacy’’ was 
created from these variables. There was a ceiling effect for Liking and Closeness ratings 
for Close Others, so the composite score Intimacy was not created for Close Others. 
Participants also rated themselves on the social comparison task (i.e., compared 
themselves with the average peer). 
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FMRI Data Acquisition 
All images were collected on a 3.0-T GE Signa EXCITE scanner at the University 
of Texas at Austin Imaging Research Center. Functional images were acquired with a 
GRAPPA sequence (time repetition = 2000 ms, time echo = 30 ms, field of view = 240, 
voxel size 2.5 x 2.5 x 3.3 mm) with each volume consisting of 35 axial slices oriented to 
the AC-PC line. These parameters were implemented to optimize coverage of the OFC 
without sacrificing whole-brain acquisition. A high-resolution SPGR T1-weighted image 
was also acquired from each subject. 
FMRI Data Analysis 
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology). Functional images were recontructed from k-space using a linear 
time interpolation algorithm to double the effective sampling rate. Image volumes were 
corrected for slice-timing skew using temporal sinc interpolation and for movement using 
rigid-body transformation parameters. Functional data and structural data were 
coregistered and normalized into a standard anatomical space (2-mm isotropic voxels) 
based on the echo planar imaging and T1 templates (Montreal Neurological Institute), 
respectively. Images were smoothed with an 8-mm full-width at half- maximum Gaussian 
kernel. To remove drifts within sessions, a high- pass filter with a cutoff period of 128 s 
was applied. 
A fixed-effects analysis modeled event-related responses for each participant. For 
each Target (Close Other, Non-Close Other), the Positive-Specific, Positive-Broad, 
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Negative-Specific, and Negative-Broad conditions were modeled as events using a 
canonical hemodynamic response function with a temporal derivative. A general linear 
model analysis created contrast images for each participant. Contrasts relevant to the 
hypotheses were calculated. First, contrast images were calculated to examine the 
interaction of trait Breadth (Specific, Broad) and Target (Close Other, Non-Close Other) 
collapsed across Valence (Positive, Negative) on neural activation. Based on previous 
research, judgments of Close Other Broad traits are more likely to be better than average 
as compared with judgments of Close Other Specific and all Non-Close Other traits (Neff 
& Karney 2002; Suls et al. 2002). Therefore, the Target X Breadth interaction contrast 
was modeled as (Close Other Broad –3; Close Other Specific +1; Non-Close Other 
Specific +1; Non-Close Other Broad +1). The Target X Breadth interaction contrast 
introduces the potential confound of Non-Close Other Intimacy. Previous research 
suggests that the motivation to cast other people (e.g., roommates) in a positive light may 
vary to the extent that they are more intimate and well liked (Taylor & Koivumaki 1976; 
Suls et al. 2002). For the minority of participants who rated their roommates high on 
intimacy, the neural hypotheses for the Non-Close Other (i.e., roommate) condition 
would more closely resemble the hypotheses for the Close Other condition. More 
specifically, neural regions that differentiate Broad from Specific traits for Close Others 
may also differentiate Broad from Specific traits for Non-Close Others (i.e., roommates) 
to the extent that they are more intimate and well liked. Therefore, the Target X Breadth 
interaction contrast controlled for Non-Close Other Intimacy once they were entered into 
group level analyses (see below).  
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Contrasts from each participant were used in a second-level analysis treating 
participants as a random effect. The group average SPM{t} maps were masked by a 
priori regions of interest (ROIs) and only clusters that survived correction for multiple 
comparisons (P < 0.05 FWE, k = 10) in a priori ROIs were interpreted. The ROIs were 
based on the activations found in Study 1A (Beer & Hughes 2010) and were defined by 
8-mm-radius spheres around the peaks of activation clusters: MPFC (BA 9: 12, 54, 34; 
BA 10: 8, 64, 24), medial OFC (MOFC) (BA 11: –2, 56, –16 and –4, 46, –10), bilateral 
lateral OFC (LOFC) (left BA 47: –32, 34, –14; right BA 47: 28, 28, –20), and dACC (10, 
26, 34). Parameter estimates from significantly activated clusters from relevant contrasts 
were extracted using Marsbar (Brett et al. 2002). The parameter estimates were then used 
to test for significant correlations between brain activation identified by our main 
contrasts and individual differences in behavioral ratings (Kriegeskorte et al. 2009; 
Poldrack & Mumford 2009; Vul et al. 2009). 
A test for significant correlation examined whether reduced neural activation for 
the Close Other Broad condition as compared with the other 3 conditions was driven by 
individuals who also tended to rate Close Other Broad traits as more above average 
compared with their ratings of the other 3 conditions. Therefore, parameter estimates 
from significantly activated clusters from the Target X Breadth interaction contrast were 
tested for significant correlation with individual differences in Close Other Broad ratings 
compared with the Close Other Specific and all Non-Close Other ratings (i.e., 
Differences in Social Comparison Ratings). First, judgments of Negative traits were 
reverse scored so that ratings could be collapsed across valence to reflect deviation from 
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the average peer for the Specific and Broad trait conditions. When reverse scoring is 
applied to social comparisons of negative traits, higher values indicate greater above 
average ratings (e.g., more positive traits, fewer negative traits), whereas values closer to 
zero indicate greater similarity to the average peer. Individual differences in Close Other 
Broad ratings compared with ratings of the other 3 conditions was calculated by applying 
the same weights of the Target X Breadth interaction contrast to the behavioral ratings 
(Close Other Broad Rating –3; Close Other Specific Rating +1; Non-Close Other 
Specific Rating +1; Non-Close Other Broad Rating +1). With this coding scheme, high 
scores were closer to zero and indicated that Close Other Broad trait ratings did not differ 
from ratings of the other 3 conditions. On the low end, scores tended to be more negative 
and indicated greater above average ratings in the Close Other Broad condition compared 
with the other 3 conditions. Therefore, a negative correlation between this behavioral 
index and neural activation indicates less activation in relation to above average ratings. 
RESULTS 
Differences between Close Other and Non-Close Other Relationships  
As a manipulation check, individual differences in Duration of Relationship, 
Liking, Closeness, and Similarity of Close Others were compared with Non-Close others. 
Duration of Relationship was significantly longer for Close Others than Non-Close 
Others (Close Other: M = 37.89 months, SD = 23.33; Non-Close Other: M = 20.00 
months, SD = 33.93; t(19) = 2.23, p < 0.05). Close Others were rated more highly than 
Non-Close Others on Liking (Close Other: M = 5.0, SD = 0; Non-Close Other: M = 3.7, 
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SD = 1.3; t(19) = 4.47, p < 0.05), Closeness (Close Other: M = 5.0, SD = 0; Non-Close 
Other: M = 3.2, SD = 1.4; t(19) = 5.28, p < 0.05), and Similarity (Close Other: M = 4.1, 
SD = 0.9; Non-Close Other: M = 2.7, SD = 1.5; t(19) = 3.56, p < 0.05). 
Task Performance 
Consistent with previous research, no gender differences were found in responses 
or reaction times (F s < 1), so all results are reported collapsed across gender (Dunning et 
al. 1989; Kenny & Acitelli 2001; Beer & Hughes 2010). Social comparisons were 
characterized by a significant interaction between Valence (Positive, Negative), Breadth 
(Specific, Broad), and Target (Close Other, Non-Close Other, Self: 3-way interaction: 
F(1,19) = 6.39, p < 0.05; see Figure 4). As expected, judgments in the Broad condition 
were associated with greater deviations from about average in the Close Other and the 
post-scan Self-condition but not in the Non-Close Other condition. Both Close Others 
and Self were judged as significantly more likely to have Positive-Broad traits (Close 
Other: t(19) = 5.70, P < 0.05; Self: t(19) = 7.36, p < 0.05) and significantly less likely to 
have Negative-Broad traits (Close Other: t(19) = –9.89, p < 0.05; Self: t(19) = –8.89, p < 
0.05) when compared with their respective Specific conditions. Participants did not just 
claim positive traits and downplay negative traits for their Close Others and the Self; they 
were most likely to exhibit better than average judgments in relation to broad traits. 
In contrast, judgments of Non-Close Others were significantly differentiated by 
Valence (t(19) = 2.61, p < 0.05) but were not significantly differentiated by Breadth (see 
Figure 4). Ratings either did not significantly differ from the about average point on the 
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scale (e.g., Positive-Broad: t(19) = 1.81, p > 0.05; Positive-Specific: t(19) = 0.78, p > 
0.05) or fell within the same range as the Specific ratings for the other targets (all ts < 1). 
 
Figure 4: Behavioral results for social comparison evaluations of other people  
Means and standard errors of Close Other, Non-Close Other, and (post-scan) Self-
evaluations of positive and negative traits in comparison to an average peer. On average, 
the sample should estimate their traits at the midpoint of the scale (‘‘0’’) for unbiased 
evaluations. 
 
Positive ratings were faster than Negative ratings in the Close Other and Non-
Close Other conditions (F(1,19) = 4.93, p < 0.05). No significant effects were found for 
Breadth (F(1,19) = 1.13, p > 0.05), Target (F(1,19) = 0.13, p > 0.05), or any pairwise 
interaction of these variables (Fs < 1.5). The 3-way interaction was marginally significant 
(F(1,19) = 3.73, p = 0.07); this effect was driven by the especially fast reaction times for 
the Positive-Broad ratings of Close Other. 
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FMRI Results 
OFC and, to a Lesser Extent, dACC Are Associated with Judgments that Are Closer 
to Average 
No significant activation was found for MPFC or PCC in the Target X Breadth 
interaction contrast. Instead, the neural regions that differentiated Close Other Broad trait 
judgments from Close Other Specific and all Non-Close Other trait judgments (Figure 5) 
were the same as those associated with differentiating Broad from Specific trait 
judgments for the self in Study 1A (Beer & Hughes 2010). The Target X Breadth 
interaction contrast showed significant activation in the 1) MOFC (BA 11: peak = –10, 
48, –14; t-stat = 4.08, k = 129, P < 0.05 FWE), 2) left LOFC (BA 47: peak = –24, 42, –
14; t-stat = 4.21, k = 77, P < 0.05 FWE), and marginally significant activation in the 3) 
dACC (BA 24: peak = 14,28,30; t-stat = 3.16, k = 75, P = 0.08 FWE). MOFC, LOFC, 
and, to a lesser extent, dACC, were associated with reduced activity in the Close Other 




Figure 5: Neural regions associated with reduced better-than-average evaluations of other 
people. 
Neural regions identified by the Target X Breadth interaction contrast and parameter 
estimates in relation to baseline extracted for each condition of Close Other and Non-
Close Other (x=10: MOFC [BA 11]; y=42: LOFC [BA 47]; x=14: dACC [BA 24]). 
MOFC, LOFC, and, to a lesser extent, dACC, are associated with reduced activity in the 
Close Other Broad condition as compared with Close Other Specific and all Non-Close 
Other conditions. 
 
OFC Is Negatively Modulated by Individual Differences in ‘‘Above Average’’ 
Judgments 
The reduced neural activation for the Close Other Broad condition compared with 
the other 3 conditions was driven by individuals who tended to rate Close Other Broad 
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traits as above average compared with their ratings of the other 3 conditions. Parameter 
estimates from the Target X Breadth interaction contrasts were negatively correlated with 
behavioral indices of how much participants evaluated their close others as above average 
on broad traits compared with all other conditions. The more participants viewed their 
Close Others as better than the average peer in the Broad trait condition (compared with 
the other 3 conditions), the less they recruited MOFC (r = –0.56, p < 0.05) and LOFC (r = 
–0.45, p < 0.05) (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Individual differences in better-than-average responses modulate OFC 
activation 
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Social-comparative ratings modulate neural activation from the Target 3 Breadth 
interaction contrast. Scatter plots depict the correlation between individual differences in 
social comparison ratings and MOFC and LOFC activation identified in the Target 3 
Breadth interaction contrast. The more participants rated their Close Others as better than 
average in the Broad trait condition compared with the other 3 conditions, the less they 
recruited OFC regions in the Close Other Broad condition compared with the other 3 
conditions. 
DISCUSSION 
Study 1B provides converging evidence for the neural systems associated with 
positively-biased evaluation by decoupling better-than-average responses from the trait 
breadth manipulation. Study 1B results show that OFC and dACC activation associated 
with better-than-average judgments cannot be explained by the specificity of the trait 
stimuli. OFC and, to a lesser extent, dACC were associated with conditions of reduced 
better-than-average judgments, which included the Specific trait condition for Close 
Others, and both trait breadth conditions for Non-Close Others (i.e., Broad and Specific 
traits). Furthermore, the more participants viewed their Close Others and Non-Close 
Others as better than their average peer, the less they recruited medial and lateral OFC 
activation. The pattern of neural activation found in the main contrast and individual 
difference analysis reflect the Target (Close Other, Non-Close Other) by Trait Breadth 
(Specific, Broad) interaction found in better-than-average judgments rather than a main 
effect of Trait Breadth regardless of Social Target. If OFC and dACC activation were 
driven by properties of the judgment stimuli and not positively-biased social 
comparisons, then OFC and dACC activation should have differentiated Specific from 
Broad traits for Close Others and Non-Close Others. Instead, the present findings show 
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that OFC and dACC activation differentiate judgments that are better than average from 
judgments that are more similar to average.  
 The findings from Study 1B also contribute to a large body of research on the 
neural systems involved in social cognition. Previous research on social cognition 
suggests that evaluations of other people, much like self-evaluations, recruit increased 
MPFC and PCC activation compared to non-social judgments (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2005; 
Jenkins et al., 2008). Just as previous research suggests that MPFC and PCC may support 
processes that are engaged when evaluating the self and other people (Jenkins et al., 
2008; Krienen et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005), the present 
findings suggest that OFC and dACC may support processes that are engaged when 
making positively-biased evaluations about the self and other people. Taken together, 
Studies 1A and 1B identify a core set of neural regions, comprised of OFC and dACC 
function, that is modulated by positively-biased evaluation. However, Studies 1A and 1B 
do not address how an explicitly manipulated self-protection motivation may change the 
engagement of this core set of neural regions that underlie positivity bias. 
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AIM 2: DOES SELF-PROTECTION MOTIVATION CHANGE THE 
ENGAGEMENT OF NEURAL SYSTEMS OF POSITIVITY BIAS? 
Study 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Study 2 seeks to examine whether a heightened self-protection motivation 
changes the engagement of the core set of neural regions associated with positivity bias, 
or whether additional neural associations of positivity bias are brought online. Studies 1A 
and 1B found that a core set of neural regions comprised of OFC and, to a lesser extent 
dACC was associated with reduced positively-biased self-evaluations. However, these 
previous studies did not elicit positivity bias by explicitly manipulating threat, so it is not 
known if a heightened self-protection motivation elicits positivity bias via the same 
neural processes or whether heightened self-protection motivation changes the 
engagement of those neural processes. In order to begin to understand whether positivity 
biases represents a single phenomenon or distinct phenomena as a function of whether 
self-protection motivation is heightened, research is needed that examines the effect of 
explicit threat on the neural associations of positivity bias identified in Studies 1A and 
1B.  
Study 2 takes a step toward addressing this open question by examining the neural 
systems associated with positively-biased self-evaluations elicited by explicit threat. As 
mentioned above, explicit threat increases the tendency to evaluate the self as better than 
the average peer presumably as a way to protect the self (e.g., Brown, 2012; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2004). Therefore, a threat manipulation was used to elicit positivity bias in a 
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social comparison task in which trait breadth had previously been used to examine the 
neural systems associated with positively-biased evaluations (Study 1A: Beer & Hughes, 
2010; Study 1B: Hughes & Beer, in press-a). Examining whether heightened self-
protection motivation changes the engagement of the neural systems associated with 
positivity bias in self-evaluations may begin to inform our understanding of whether 
positivity biases represent a single phenomenon or multiple distinct phenomena. For 
example, if a heightened self-protection motivation elicited by explicit threat changes the 
engagement of the neural systems related to positivity bias or engages additional neural 
regions, this might suggest that positivity biases may represent distinct phenomena as a 
function of heightened self-protection motivation. On the other hand, if a self-protection 
motivation elicited by explicit threat does not affect the neural systems associated with 
positivity bias, this might suggest that positivity bias represent a unitary phenomenon 
regardless of whether or not self-protection motivation is especially heightened. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Data analyses focused on eighteen right-handed participants (12 female, Age: 
Mean=18.7 years, SD=0.8 years) that were recruited in compliance with the human 
subjects regulations of the University of Texas at Austin and compensated with $15/hour 
or course credit. Three additional participants were excluded due to excessive head 
movement (+/-3mm). All participants were native English speakers, free from 
medications, psychological, and neurological conditions that might influence the 
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measurement of cerebral blood flow, and fell within a normal range of self-esteem (>3 on 
a 1 to 5 scale for the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale: Rosenberg, 1979) to avoid confounds 
from outlier ranges of self-esteem. As mentioned above, most individuals have positive 
self-views (e.g., Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997; Twenge & Campbell, 2008); 
individuals with low self-esteem react to threat in an idiosyncratic manner (e.g., Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2004; vanDellen et al., 2011).  
As described below, the present study utilized deception to provide social-
evaluative feedback and studies utilizing deception methods typically find between 5-
25% of participants are wise to the deception (Baumeister et al., 2005; Gardner, Picket, & 
Brewer, 2000; Mehta & Josephs, 2006; Stricker, Messick, & Jackson, 1969; Twenge & 
Campbell, 2003). Consistent with this previous research, four additional participants were 
excluded due to expressing suspicion in the veracity of the threat manipulation during the 
final debriefing procedure (two participants claimed to be suspicious prior to fMRI 
portion of the study, two participants became suspicious during the fMRI portion of the 
study; see below for Debriefing Procedure). It is unlikely that the remaining participants 
were suspicious but simply did not express it (Stricker, Messick, & Jackson, 1969). First, 
all participants were subject to a lengthy debriefing procedure (for more information, see 
below). Second, norms for behavioral responses have been established by previous 
research using the same procedure as the current study. Whereas the twenty-one 
participants who expressed belief in the manipulation made behavioral responses similar 
to those reported in previous research (Beer & Hughes, 2010; Hughes & Beer, in press-b; 
Vohs & Heatherton, 2004), the participants who expressed disbelief confirmed their 
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suspicion by responding in a manner that is inconsistent with established norms (Stricker, 
Messick, & Jackson, 1969). 
Task 
Participants completed the same social comparison task used in previous fMRI 
studies of social comparison (Beer & Hughes, 2010; Study 1: Hughes & Beer 2011) with 
the addition of a standardized social evaluative threat manipulation used in previous 
research (Beer, Chester, Hughes, forthcoming; Leary et al., 1998; Horton & Sedikides, 
2009; Swann et al., 1990; Somerville et al., 2006, 2010a). The components of the 
procedure are described below followed by an overview of the task sequence. 
Threat manipulation. Threat was manipulated by providing participants with 
unfavorable or favorable social-evaluative feedback (e.g., Beer, Chester, Hughes, 
forthcoming; Swann et al., 1990; Leary et al., 1998; Horton & Sedikides, 2009; 
Somerville et al., 2006, 2010a). Prior to scanning, participants were photographed and led 
to believe that other people would evaluate their likability from the photographs.  
During the scanning procedure, threat was manipulated with ostensible feedback 
about participants’ likability. Feedback Cues consisted of (a) 10 randomly-selected 
photographs of people (5 male, 5 female) that had ostensibly evaluated the participant’s 
likability and (b) pie charts indicating how many people found the participant unlikable 
(Threat Cue condition: 6, 7, or 8 of the 10 people; No Threat condition: 0 of the 10 
people)(see Figure 7).  
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Social comparison task. Participants rated how they compared to their average 
peer on personality trait words using a 5-point scale (-2=much less than the average UT 
student; 0=about the same as the average UT student; +2=much more than the average 
UT student). Trait words were undesirable traits from the narrowly-construed trait 
category in previous fMRI studies (e.g., stingy, jealous, messy, bossy; see Study 1A: 
Beer & Hughes, 2010; Study 1B: Hughes & Beer in press-a). A comparable “average 
peer” was ensured by recruiting University of Texas at Austin students who evaluated 
their personality traits in relation to the average University of Texas student of their same 
age and gender (Beer & Hughes, 2010; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). Responses were 
reversed-scored to indicate positively-biased social comparisons (i.e., higher scores 
indicated the self had less of the undesirable traits compared to peers). 
Task Sequence. For each trial, participants (a) received threatening or 
nonthreatening feedback and (b) then answered a block of social comparison questions. A 
Threat or No Threat Cue (4 seconds) was followed by a screen with a fixation point that 
indicated participants should clear their minds. The fixation point screens were randomly 
jittered (2 sec (50%), 4 sec (25%), 6 sec (25%); Donaldson, Petersen, Ollinger, & 
Buckner, 2001) to permit independent modeling of neural activation elicited by the cue 
and subsequent social comparison task. Participants then completed a block of 8 social-
comparison questions (2 seconds each for a total of 16 seconds) followed by a screen 
with a fixation point that indicated they should clear their minds (16 seconds). 
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Figure 7: Stimuli and timing for threat manipulation and self-evaluation task  
First, participants were presented with a 4 sec cue that indicated the Threat condition 
(Threat, No-Threat). Second, each cue screen was followed by a 16 sec block of the 
social-comparison task. Blocks were followed by a 16 sec screen depicting a fixation 
point. A jittered ITI separated the Threat Cue from self-evaluation Block. 
 
FMRI data were collected in one 8-minute, 48-second scan (6 blocks of social 
comparison questions: 3 primed by Threat; 3 primed by No-Threat). The presentation 
order of the Threat and No-Threat Cues and trait words in the social comparison blocks 
was randomly assigned across participants. Stimuli were projected onto a screen mounted 
on the bed of the scanner and head motion was limited using foam padding. E-prime on a 
Windows XP was used to present stimuli and collect responses. 
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Post-Scan Task  
A post-scan procedure was included to better understand how participants 
performed the social-comparative task. Research has robustly shown that threat’s effect 
on social-comparative evaluations is most often accounted for by emphasizing one’s own 
desirability rather than derogating others (Campbell, 1986; Steele et al., 1993; Aronson et 
al., 1995; Dodgson & Wood, 1998; vanDellen et al., 2011). There is some evidence that 
when people can choose the target of comparison, they may choose someone who is 
worse off than themselves to make themselves look better (Wills, 1981; Brown, 1986; 
Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wood et al., 1999). In the present study, it was unlikely that 
participants could selectively derogate the target of comparison in the Threat condition. 
The target of comparison (i.e., the average peer of same age and gender) was held 
constant across the Threat manipulation. However, the possibility that the average other 
was evaluated differently across conditions was tested in a post-scan procedure. 
Participants rated the extent to which personality traits described their average peer 
(“How well does this trait describe the average University of Texas student:” same scale 
as above) in blocks that were preceded by Threat or No Threat to self.  
Debriefing Procedure  
 In order to ensure that the participants included in all analyses were naïve to the 
deception involved in the threat manipulation, a thorough debriefing interview was 
conducted at the end of the study (for a discussion of the importance of excluding 
suspicious participants from analyses, see Stricker, Messick, & Jackson, 1969). This 
debriefing procedure was designed to give participants ample opportunity to express 
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whether they knew that the threatening and non-threatening feedback was false. The 
debriefing procedure gradually probed for participants’ suspicion through open-ended 
questions about their general impressions of the purpose of the experiment as well as any 
thoughts and feelings about any aspect of the study (e.g., “What do you think the 
experiment was about?”, “What kind of feedback did you get from other participants in 
the study?”, “Did you have any reactions to the feedback you received?”). Participants 
were excluded from the final sample if they expressed suspicion or disbelief at any point 
during the open-ended questions of the debriefing procedure. After the question period, 
participants were asked not to divulge any information about any aspect of the study to 
their peers and provided with a full explanation of the study with a special emphasis on 
the bogus nature of the feedback they received (see Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968; Mills, 
1976). 
FMRI Data Acquisition 
All images were collected on a 3.0-T GE Signa EXCITE scanner at the University 
of Texas at Austin Imaging Research Center. Functional images were acquired with a 
GRAPPA sequence (TR=2000 ms, TE=30 ms, FOV=240, voxel size 2.5x2.5x3.3-mm) 
with each volume consisting of 35 axial slices oriented to the AC-PC line (e.g., Beer & 
Hughes, 2010; Hughes & Beer, in press-a). These parameters were implemented to 
optimize coverage of the orbitofrontal cortex without sacrificing whole-brain acquisition. 
A high-resolution SPGR T1-weighted image was also acquired from each subject. 
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FMRI Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology). Functional images were reconstructed from k-space using a linear 
time-interpolation algorithm to double the effective sampling rate. Image volumes were 
corrected for slice-timing skew using temporal sinc-interpolation and for movement using 
rigid-body transformation parameters. Functional data and structural data were co-
registered and normalized into a standard anatomical space (2mm isotropic voxels) based 
on the EPI and T1 templates (Montreal Neurological Institute), respectively. Images were 
smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter with a cutoff period 
of 128-sec was applied to remove within-session drifts. 
A fixed-effects analysis modeled (a) the Threat and No-Threat Social Comparison 
blocks using a canonical block hemodynamic response function and (b) the Threat cues 
and the jittered fixation screens as regressors of no interest using canonical hemodynamic 
response function with a temporal derivative. The 16-second fixation blocks estimated 
baseline for the 16-second Social Comparison blocks.  A general linear model analysis 
created contrast images for each participant to examine neural activation in the Social 
Comparison blocks as a function of Threat (blocks primed by Threat vs No-Threat, No-
Threat vs Threat). Contrasts from each participant were used in a second-level analysis 
treating participants as a random effect. The group average SPM{t} maps were masked 
by a priori ROIs and only clusters that survived correction for multiple comparisons (P < 
0.05 FWE, k = 10) were interpreted. A priori ROIs were comprised of activation clusters 
found in previous studies of this social comparison task (Study 1A: Beer & Hughes, 
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2010; Study 1B: Hughes & Beer, in press-a): MPFC (BA 9: 12,54,34; BA 10: 8,64,24), 
MOFC (-2,56,-16; -4,46,-10), bilateral LOFC (left BA 47: -32,34,-14; right BA 47: 
28,28,-20), dACC (10,26,34), PCC (-4,-38,28), vACC (14,38,-4), and insula (-38,14,6) 
(all ROIs were 8mm-radius spheres, center coordinates listed in relation to each region). 
The current study is the first to examine threat’s effect on social comparisons so it was 
not possible to delineate task-specific ROIs that might relate to the threat manipulation. 
Instead, ROIs were delineated based on neuroanatomical regions associated with threat 
and its regulation in previous research (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Kober et al., 2008): 
amygdala, dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC), ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) (defined by the 
Automated Anatomical Labelling map: Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Finally, 
correlation analyses tested whether individual differences in behavior modulated neural 
activation identified from the main contrasts. Parameter estimates from the main contrast 
were extracted (Brett et al., 2002) and correlated with individual differences in Threat’s 
effect on positively biased social comparisons (i.e., Threat Average Social Comparison 
Rating minus No-Threat Average Social Comparison Rating).   
RESULTS 
Task Performance 
In response to threat, participants significantly emphasized their own desirability. 
In the Threat condition, participants rated themselves as having significantly fewer 
undesirable traits in comparison to their average peer (Threat: M=.67, SD=.38; No-
Threat: M=.55, SD=.36; t(17)=4.07, p <.05: Figure 8). Threat did not significantly affect 
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reaction times for social comparison ratings in the scanner (Threat: M=1.29 sec, SD= .76; 
No-Threat: M=1.29, SD=1.07 sec; t <1, ns) or the post-scan ratings of the average peer 
(Threat: M=.09, SD=.34; No-Threat: M=.18, SD=.35; t <1, ns).  
 
Figure 8: Behavioral results of social-comparative ratings primed by Threat and No 
Threat  
FMRI Results 
Social comparisons in response to threat are associated with increased activation in 
OFC, MPFC, amygdala, and insula 
The neural activation pattern associated with positively-biased self-evaluation in 
the Threat condition was distinct from neural patterns found in previous neural research 
using this task (Study 1A: Beer & Hughes, 2010; Study 1B: Hughes & Beer, in press-a). 
In contrast to the No Threat condition, social comparisons in the Threat condition were 
associated with significantly increased activation in MOFC, bilateral LOFC, and 
amygdala, and, to a lesser extent, MPFC and left insula (see Table 1 and Figure 9). No 
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significant activation was found for the reverse contrast (Social Comparison block 
primed by No Threat > Threat) in any of the a priori ROIs. 
Table 1: Neural regions associated with social comparisons primed by Threat versus No 
Threat. 
                 MNI Coordinates 
Brain region  BA No. of voxels  x y z t(17) 
Medial OFC  11  40  -10 54 -16 6.19* 
Left Lateral OFC 47  51  -30 38 -20 3.41* 
Right Lateral OFC 47  158  28 32 -24 3.49*  
Medial PFC  9  64  10 58 38 2.97† 
Medial PFC  10  48  4 68 22 2.82† 
Insula     153  -40 18 8 2.99† 
Left Amygdala   90  -16 -6 -18 3.49* 
Right Amygdala   133  26 2 -24 4.11*   
 





Figure 9: Neural activation from the social comparison ratings primed by the Threat 
versus No-Threat contrast.  
Parameter estimates in relation to baseline extracted for each condition (x = -8: MOFC 
(BA 11); x = 34: Bilateral LOFC (BA 47); x = 6: MPFC (BA 9, BA 10); y = 16: Insula; y 




Individual differences in positively-biased social comparisons as a function of threat 
modulate MOFC and MPFC 
Further analyses suggested that the increased MOFC and MPFC activation in the 
contrast of Social Comparison block primed by Threat > No Threat was driven by 
individual differences in positively-biased social comparisons. The more participants 
evaluated themselves as ‘above average’ in the Threat condition, the more they recruited 
the MOFC and MPFC regions identified in the main contrast. Individual differences in 
positively-biased social comparisons as a function of Threat significantly correlated with 
parameter estimates extracted from the MOFC  (r = .78, p < .05) and MPFC (r = .53, p < 
.05) activity found in the Social Comparison block primed by Threat > No Threat 
contrast (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Individual differences in positively-biased evaluations as a function of Threat 
modulate neural activation 
Social-comparative ratings modulate MOFC and MPFC activation from the Threat > No-
Threat contrast. Scatterplots depict individual differences in positively-biased social 
comparisons as a function of Threat (Social Comparison ratings primed by Threat – 
Social Comparison ratings primed by No-Threat) in relation to parameter estimates of the 
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MOFC and MPFC activation identified in the Social Comparison primed by Threat > 
Social Comparison primed by No-Threat contrast. 
DISCUSSION 
Study 2 sought to extend the findings from Studies 1A and 1B by examining 
whether a heightened self-protection motivation changes the engagement of a core set of 
neural regions implicated in positively-biased self-evaluation. In Study 2, an explicit 
threat manipulation was used to elicit positivity bias in the same social comparison task 
used in Studies 1A and 1B. Study 2 shows for the first time that an explicit threat 
manipulation changes the engagement of neural systems associated with positivity bias, 
and engages additional neural regions. Specifically, social comparison ratings in response 
to threatening feedback were associated with increased MOFC, LOFC, amygdala, and, to 
a lesser extent, MPFC and insula activation. Furthermore, individual differences in the 
extent to which threat increased positively-biased self-evaluations were associated with 
increased MOFC and MPFC activation. In contrast, Study 1A and 1B found that 
positively-biased evaluations elicited by contextual factors other than an explicit threat 
were associated with decreased activation in MOFC, LOFC, and, to a lesser extent, 
dACC. The similarities and differences between the neural associations of positivity bias 
in the current study and previous research cannot be accounted for by differences in the 
stimuli used to measure positivity bias; the current study used the same social comparison 
task and stimuli as Study 1A and Study 1B. The major difference was that the current 
study elicited positivity bias as a response to an explicit manipulation of threat. 
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While Study 2 represents a step toward informing different perspectives for how 
positivity biases in self-evaluations are accomplished, the pattern of neural activation 
associated with positivity bias when threat is explicitly heightened does not conclusively 
address whether positivity biases represent a unitary phenomenon or multiple phenomena 
as a function of heightened self-protection motivation. Study 2 did not find the same 
reduction in OFC and dACC activation associated with positivity bias when threat was 
not explicitly heightened (Study 1A and 1B). Study 2 also did not find that a completely 
different set of neural regions were involved in eliciting positivity bias when threat was 
explicitly heightened. Instead, Study 2 found a different pattern of neural activation in 
many of the same regions as Studies 1A and 1B (i.e., MOFC, LOFC), as well as 
additional neural modulation (i.e., MPFC, amygdala, insula). Taken together, these 
findings raise questions that promise to further elucidate how positivity biases are 
underpinned in the brain, which may in turn lead to a better understanding of how they 
are accomplished in different motivational contexts.  
First, what role does MOFC play in positivity bias that might help explain why 
the direction of its association changes as a function of a self-protection motivation? One 
possibility may be that the MOFC supports the same psychological process regardless of 
whether threat is explicitly heightened, but may produce attenuation versus enhancement 
of positively-biased responses in different contexts. In this case, MOFC may support a 
common psychological process in positivity bias but the implementation of that 
psychological process may differ depending on contextual motivators. An alternative 
possibility is that different psychological processes are supported by the MOFC in 
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positively-biased evaluation. For example, MOFC may interact with additional neural 
regions that are engaged by a heightened self-protection motivation, and its unique 
interaction may support a psychological process that is distinct from the psychological 
process supported by MOFC when self-protection motivation is not heightened. In this 
case, MOFC’s interaction with one network of regions may engage a mechanism that 
produces enhancement of positively-biased responses in the context of explicit threat, and 
its interaction with a second network of regions may engage a different mechanism that 
produces attenuation of positively-biased responses when threat is not explicitly 
heightened. Research that addresses these possibilities is necessary in order to begin to 
shed light on whether self-protection motivation engages a unique path to positivity 
biases in self-evaluation.  
Second, what is the role of MPFC in positivity bias in the context of threat? One 
possibility is that the correlation between MPFC and MOFC activation and increased 
positivity bias after threat may indicate that MPFC and MOFC interact and their joint 
activation leads to increased positivity bias in evaluations when threat is explicitly 
heightened. A related possibility is that MPFC engages a mechanism that operates in 
parallel or in addition to the mechanism supported by MOFC, and their parallel or 
additive activation leads to increased positivity bias when threat is explicitly heightened. 
For example, people compensate for threat by drawing on core aspects of self and 
increasing their influence in subsequent self-evaluations (Aronson et al., 1995; 
Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Kunda, 1990; Steele et al., 1993; 
vanDellen et al., 2011; Wood et al., 1999), and there are reasons to believe that the 
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MPFC may support access to these core aspects of self. Previous research suggests that 
MPFC is associated with accessing self-related information in general (e.g., Macrae et al., 
2004; Moran et al., 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005), and more certainly held self-related 
information in particular (D’Argembeau et al., 2012). However, more research is needed 
to examine the precise mechanism that is supported by the MPFC in positively-biased 
evaluation in the context of threat.  
Lastly, more research is needed to understand the role of the additional neural 
regions that are brought online in the context of explicit threat. For example, amygdala 
and insula activation were greater for social comparisons in response to explicit threat, 
but their activation did not predict individual differences in positivity bias as a function of 
explicit threat. However, this does not discount the possibility that amygdala and insula 
activation may play a role in positively-biased evaluation as a function of explicit threat. 
One possibility is that these additional neural regions may modulate activation in the 
MOFC and MPFC network that predicts individual variability in positively-biased 
responses as a function of threat. Another possibility is that cross-subject correlations 
aren’t telling the whole story about amygdala and insula function. Although amygdala 
and insula were not linked to positively-biased responses across subjects, they may be 
linked to positively-biased responses within subjects. However, the better-than-average 
paradigm and the blocked-nature of the task used are not well suited to examine the 
relationship between trial-by-trial neural activation and positively-biased responses. 
Future research will benefit from implementing tasks that allow a trial-by-trial mapping 
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of neural activation and positively-biased responses as a function of explicit threat to 
uncover potential relationships at a within subject level of analysis.  
Finally, a limitation of Study 2 is that the within subjects nature of the threat 
manipulation did not allow for an increased number of blocks, which may have lead to 
decreased statistical power. Specifically, pilot testing revealed that the inclusion of a 
greater number of blocks reduces the effect of threat on behavioral responses, potentially 
due to habituation to the threat cues. While the blocked nature of the task may have 
partially alleviated power issues related to the limitation of the threat manipulation, it 
does not discount the possibility that a heightened self-protection motivation may engage 
additional neural regions that we did not have the power to detect. Therefore, future 
research should implement task designs that allow for increased repetition of the threat 
manipulation in order to increase statistical power.  
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AIM 3: WHAT MECHANISMS ARE SUPPORTED BY NEURAL 
SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH POSITIVITY BIAS? 
Study 3  
INTRODUCTION 
Study 3 examines one possibility raised by Studies 1A, 1B and Study 2 that may 
explain why MOFC supports increased positivity bias in self-evaluations when threat is 
explicitly heightened and decreased positivity bias in self-evaluations when threat is not 
explicitly heightened: shifts in decision thresholds. Researchers have theorized that one 
way to change the positively-biased nature of evaluations is by shifting the decision 
thresholds that influence the expression of baseline positively-biased associations 
(Paulhus et al., 2003). Research suggests that positivity bias is prepotent or at least relies 
on relatively automatized processing (Alicke et al., 1995; Beer & Hughes, 2010; Beer, 
Chester, & Hughes, forthcoming; Hixon & Swann, 1993; Hughes & Beer, unpublished 
data; Koole et al., 2001; Lench & Ditto, 2008; Paulhus et al., 1989; Swann et al., 1990). 
Most people have positive associations with self (Gray-Little et al., 1997; Koole et al., 
2001; Twenge & Campbell, 2008). Moreover, people’s positively-biased tendency to 
claim that their personality characteristics are more desirable than the personality 
characteristics of their average peer is exacerbated (e.g., Beer & Hughes, 2010; Hixon & 
Swann, 1993; Lench & Ditto, 2008; Paulhus et al., 1989; Swann et al., 1990) or 
unaffected by cognitive load (e.g., Alicke et al., 1995). Therefore, one possibility is that 
the association between MOFC activation and positively-biased responses might reflect a 
departure from this baseline or automatic positively-biased tendency as contexts change.  
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In Study 1A and 1B, people’s positively-biased tendency to claim that they or 
their romantic partners have more desirable personalities than their peers was attenuated 
when the comparisons were made for narrowly-construed traits; attenuation as a function 
of trait breadth was predicted by MOFC activation. The increased MOFC activation may 
reflect a shift in decision threshold because one potential effect of a trait breadth 
manipulation is that it shifts how liberally one can construe a trait as self-relevant and, 
consequently, judge oneself as better than one’s peers on that trait (Dunning et al., 1989). 
Therefore, the increased MOFC activation may reflect the extent to which participants 
were sensitive to the more conservative decision threshold inherent in claiming narrowly-
construed traits as especially self-relevant. In Study 2, people tended to respond to 
explicit threat by increasing their baseline self-serving tendency to claim that they have 
more desirable personalities than their peers as a way to compensate for threat; increases 
as a function of threat were predicted by MOFC activation. The increased MOFC 
activation may reflect a shift towards more liberal decision thresholds for expressing 
positive information about the self in the face of threat, and subsequently, increased 
positively-biased responses. 
The suggestion that MOFC activation may support shifts in decision thresholds as 
contexts change is consistent with the more general role of the OFC in contextual 
updating. Research has demonstrated a broad role of MOFC in contextual updating, that 
is, in shifting the threshold at which prepotent tendencies are expressed as contexts 
change (Beer, Shimamura, & Knight, 2004; Lhermitte, 1986; Stuss & Benson, 1984). 
Medial OFC activation has been associated with both the downregulation and 
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upregulation of behavior in relation to contextual changes (e.g., Bhanji & Beer, in press; 
Cooney et al., 2011; Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011; Mehta & Beer, 2009). Conversely, 
damage to the OFC, including the medial OFC, is classically associated with the 
inflexible expression of baseline or automatic tendencies even when they become 
contextually inappropriate (Lhermitte, 1986; Stuss & Benson, 1984 and see Beer et al., 
2006; Fellows & Farah, 2003; Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & di Pellegrino, 2011). Therefore, one 
way MOFC may affect self-judgments is by updating their underlying baseline (or 
automatic) strategies or components.  
Study 3 tests the possibility that MOFC supports changes in decision thresholds in 
positively-biased evaluation by drawing on signal detection measurement of decision 
thresholds and an accountability manipulation known to shift the relative liberality of 
decision thresholds that underlie positively-biased responses (Paulhus et al., 2003). 
Accountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation of having to justify one’s 
judgments, such as having to elaborate on the reasons for judgment or having the 
judgment evaluated by a third-party (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Sedikides et al., 2002). 
Participants evaluated their familiarity with blocks of existent and nonexistent knowledge 
items while being held accountable or unaccountable for their evaluations (Paulhus et al., 
2003). Signal detection theory (SDT) analyses were applied to measure the shift in 
decision threshold across conditions (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991). Previous research on the effect of accountability on overclaiming has applied 
signal detection theory (SDT) techniques to claims of knowledge and found that warning 
participants that information may be nonexistent reduces inflated claims of knowledge by 
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shifting decision thresholds in a more conservative direction (Paulhus et al., 2003). SDT 
considers a more conservative decision threshold to reflect a reduction in how liberally 
participants are willing to construe familiarity signals as indicative of actual knowledge. 
Therefore, using SDT to analyze the effects of accountability on overclaiming of 
knowledge makes it possible to measure changes in decision threshold that relate to 
positively-biased responses and test its relation to OFC activation. OFC activation should 
predict the extent to which participants adopt more conservative (i.e., less positively-
biased) decision thresholds when inflated claims have the potential to be exposed. Results 
of this study are also reported in a published manuscript (Hughes & Beer, in press-b). 
METHOD 
Participants 
Eighteen right-handed participants (9 female, M age = 20.7 years, SD = 1.9 years) 
were recruited in compliance with the human subjects regulations of the University of 
Texas at Austin and compensated with $15/hour or course credit. All participants were 
native English speakers and free from medications or psychological and/or neurological 
conditions that might influence the measurement of cerebral blood flow. 
Task 
Participants completed a modified version of the over-claiming questionnaire and 
accountability manipulation used in previous research (Paulhus et al., 2003). Participants 
rated their familiarity with blocks of knowledge items in two Accountability conditions 
(Accountable, Unaccountable: see Figure 11). Blocks of items were preceded by task 
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instructions (4 secs) and either (1) a notice that some of the upcoming items may be 
nonexistent (i.e., any self-serving claims of knowledge would be exposed (Accountable 
blocks)) or (2) no notice (Unaccountable blocks). Each instruction screen was followed 
by a 2 sec screen with a fixation point indicating that participants should clear their 
minds. Participants were then presented with blocks of knowledge items that exist (e.g., 
Billie Holiday) or do not exist (e.g., J.D. Louis) and asked to rate their familiarity with 
each item. Familiarity for each item was rated on a 4-point scale from 0 (not at all 
familiar) to 3 (very familiar). Regardless of Accountability condition, blocks consisted of 
10 items that included 6 existent and 4 nonexistent items (20 sec block; 2 secs each item).  
Participants completed 8 blocks (4 each for the Accountable and Unaccountable blocks) 
for a total of 48 existent items and 32 nonexistent items. 
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Figure 11: Stimuli and timing in over-claiming bias task  
Participants saw an instruction screen that either did or did not provide an Accountability 
cue (i.e., some of the items may be nonexistent), followed by a fixation cross, followed 
by a block of 10 trials in which participants rated their familiarity with existent (e.g., 
Billie Holiday) and nonexistent (e.g., J.D. Louis) knowledge items. The Accountable 
“Catch” blocks and Unaccountable “Catch” blocks were the same as their respective 
experimental blocks except that the phrase “Please Clear your Mind” was substituted for 
the knowledge item probes. 
 
FMRI data were collected in one 7 minute, 6 second run consisting of 
pseudorandomized Accountable, Unaccountable, and “Catch” blocks. “Catch” blocks 
were included to establish that neural differences between Accountable versus 
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Unaccountable blocks were not merely due to the presence of the Accountability cue 
screen (see Figure 11). The Accountable “Catch” blocks consisted of (a) the 4 sec 
Accountable cue screen, (b) a 2 sec fixation point, and (c) a 20 sec screen that instructed 
participants to clear their minds. The Unaccountable “Catch” blocks consisted of (a) the 4 
sec Unaccountable cue screen (b) a 2 sec fixation point, and (c) a 20 sec screen that 
instructed participants to clear their minds. Stimuli were projected onto a screen mounted 
on the bed of the scanner and head motion was limited using foam padding. E-prime on a 
Windows XP was used to present stimuli and collect responses. 
Behavioral Indices  
Conceptually, the goal of creating behavioral indices was to identify an index of 
shift in decision threshold across conditions that marked changes in positively-biased 
responses. This index is not a measure of task performance, in other words, it was not just 
how good participants were at identifying whether items existed or not as a function of 
accountability. Following previous behavioral research on the effect of accountability on 
over-claiming (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2003), signal detection theory (SDT: Green & Swets, 
1966) was used to model two indices: shifts in participants’ tendency to make inflated 
claims of knowledge (shifts in decision threshold (c)) and shifts in their ability to 
discriminate between existent and nonexistent items (shifts in discriminability (d’)). The 
decision threshold (c) provides a measure of positivity bias because it is theorized to 
reflect how strong the sense of familiarity with items is needed in order to claim 
knowledge. For example, a participant may require very strong evidence of familiarity in 
 73 
order to claim knowledge and therefore may over-claim less than a self-serving 
participant that requires much weaker evidence of familiarity in order to claim knowledge 
(see Figure 12A). Participants’ tendency to shift decision thresholds can be measured by 
contrasting the thresholds used across accountability conditions.  Discriminability (d’), on 
the other hand, represents participants’ ability to distinguish items that do exist from 
items that do not exist rather than their tendency to make inflated claims (see Figure 
12B). Discriminability (d’) does not necessarily reflect the positively-biased nature of 
knowledge claims because it does not provide information about the strategy for claiming 
knowledge, how it changes across contexts, or the strength of the evidence needed in 
order to claim knowledge. For example, two participants might be quite good at telling 
which items exist and which do not (both have high discriminability) but the participants 
will differ in how inflated their claims are if they differ in how much they claim to know 
things for which they only have very weak feelings of familiarity (high versus low 
thresholds: see Figure 12A).  
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Figure 12: Examples of familiarity distributions and decision thresholds for existent and 
nonexistent items 
(A) Vertical lines illustrate conservative and liberal decision thresholds. Thresholds 
become more conservative (higher) as they move toward the strong end of the 
distribution of internal signals of familiarity (only the items that generate internal 
familiarity signals that are stronger than the conservative threshold will get claimed). 
Thresholds become more liberal as they move downward toward the ‘weak’ end of the 
distribution (much weaker internal familiarity signal is needed to claim knowledge as 
compared to the more conservative threshold on the left. (B) Degree of overlap between 
distributions for nonexistent and existent items illustrates low and high discriminability. 
High degree of overlap indicates low discriminability (d’) (internal familiarity signals do 
not do much to distinguish nonexistent items from existent items) whereas smaller degree 
of overlap indicates high discriminability (d’) (on average, internal familiarity signal is 
stronger for existent compared to nonexistent items). 
 
 Several steps were completed to compute shifts in decision threshold (c) and 
discriminability (d’). Responses were classified into: (1) hits: claims that existent items 
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are familiar; (2) false alarms: claims that nonexistent items are familiar; (3) misses: 
claims that existent items are not familiar; and (4) correct rejections: claims that 
nonexistent items are not familiar. Following previous behavioral research on the effect 
of accountability on over-claiming (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2003), the decision threshold (c) 
and discriminability (d’) were calculated at each of the 3 cutoffs on the 0-3 rating scale 
(i.e., cutoff of 0, 1, and 2)(also see Macmillan and Creelman, 1991). For the 0 cutoff, 
responses greater than 0 were classified as a hit or false alarm, and responses of 0 were 
classified as a miss or correct reject. The same process was repeated for the cutoff of 1 
and 2. The hit rate (HR) was the proportion of the 48 existent items on which participants 
gave a familiarity rating greater than the cutoff. The false-alarm rate (FAR) was the 
proportion of the 32 nonexistent items on which participants gave a familiarity rating 
greater than the cutoff. Decision threshold (c) and discriminability (d’) were then 
calculated at each cutoff for each of the Accountable and Unaccountable conditions, and 
averaged to get a final value of decision threshold (c) and discriminability (d’) for each 
participant for each of the Accountable and Unaccountable conditions (Macmillan and 
Creelman, 1991). Shifts in threshold and discriminability were measured by subtracting 
each measure in the Unaccountable condition from its respective measure in the 
Accountable condition. Each of these measures is described below in greater detail.  
 From an SDT perspective, the decision threshold (c) provides information about 
the positively-biased nature of knowledge claims because it reflects the strength of the 
evidence needed in order to claim knowledge with an item (Macmillan and Creelman, 
1991; Paulhus et al., 2003). An observer with a high decision threshold will have low hit 
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rates and false alarm rates, whereas an observer with a low decision threshold will have 
high hit rates and false alarm rates (see Figure 12A). Therefore, the decision threshold (c) 
was used to measure over-claiming and its shift measured by contrasting across 
accountability conditions (Macmillan and Creelman, 1991; Paulhus et al., 2003):  
                (1) 
 On the other hand, SDT takes the perspective that discriminability (d’) reflects the 
ability to discriminate between existent and nonexistent items, rather than the positively-
biased nature of knowledge claims. An observer with high discriminability will have a 
high hit rate and a low false alarm rate, whereas an observer with low discriminability 
will have more similar hit rates and false alarm rates (see Figure 12B). According to 
SDT, an observer experiences an internal sense of familiarity to an item, and this internal 
sense of familiarity represents a point on a continuum of familiarity. Existent items (e.g., 
Billie Holiday) on average are theorized to generate a stronger sense of familiarity than 
nonexistent items (e.g., J.D. Louis). However, SDT also suggests that an observer may 
sometimes not feel familiar with an existent item because it is not known (i.e., it may 
generate a weak internal familiarity signal), and an observer may sometimes feel 
somewhat familiar with a nonexistent item because it is similar to something they know 
(i.e., it may generate a strong internal familiarity signal). Therefore, the most commonly 
applied SDT model assumes that the internal familiarity signals generated by these 
existent and nonexistent items are normally distributed and overlap with each other 
(Wickens, 2002; see Figure 12). The distance between the means of the existent and 
criterion = ! z(HR)+ z(FAR)
2
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nonexistent distributions represents the discriminability between existent and nonexistent 
items (HR = hit rate; FAR = false alarm rate; Macmillan and Creelman, 1991): 
             (2) 
FMRI Data Acquisition 
All images were collected on a 3.0-T GE Signa EXCITE scanner at the University 
of Texas at Austin Imaging Research Center. Functional images were acquired with a 
GRAPPA sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV = 240, voxel size 2.5 x 2.5 x 3.3 
mm) with each volume consisting of 35 axial slices oriented to the AC-PC line. These 
parameters were implemented to optimize coverage of the orbitofrontal cortex without 
sacrificing whole-brain acquisition. A high resolution SPGR T1-weighted image was also 
acquired from each subject. 
FMRI Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology). Functional images were reconstructed from k-space using a linear 
time-interpolation algorithm to double the effective sampling rate. Image volumes were 
corrected for slice-timing skew using temporal sinc-interpolation and for movement using 
rigid-body transformation parameters. Functional data and structural data were co-
registered and normalized into a standard anatomical space (2 mm isotropic voxels) based 
on the EPI and T1 templates (Montreal Neurological Institute), respectively. Images were 
d ' = z(HR)! z(FAR)
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smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 
seconds was applied to remove within-session drifts.  
At the individual subject level, a fixed-effects analysis modeled the Accountable 
blocks, Unaccountable blocks, and the Accountable and Unaccountable “Catch” blocks 
using a canonical block hemodynamic response function. A general linear model analysis 
created contrast images for each participant. Contrasts were calculated to examine neural 
activation in the contrasts of the Accountable block > Unaccountable block, 
Unaccountable block > Accountable block, and Accountable “Catch” block > 
Unaccountable “Catch” block. At the group level, contrasts from each participant were 
used in a second-level analysis treating participants as a random effect. The group 
average SPM{t} maps were corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level (based 
on the CorrClusTh algorithm created by Thomas Nichols: 
http://www.sph.umich.edu/~nichols/JohnsGems5.html) in hypothesized neuroanatomical 
regions (MPFC, MOFC, LOFC, and dACC, defined by the Automated Anatomical 
Labeling map: Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). For all results, the threshold was set to a 
minimum of 165 contiguous voxels at a voxel-wise threshold of p<.005, to achieve a 
statistical threshold of p<.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level.  
Correlation analyses tested whether individual differences in shifts in decision 
threshold (c) and discriminability (d’) modulated neural activation identified in the main 
contrasts. Parameter estimates from significant clusters identified in the main contrasts 
were extracted using Marsbar (Brett et al., 2002). The parameter estimates from 
significant clusters were tested for significant correlation with individual differences in 
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each behavioral index (controlling for the influence of the other behavioral index; shift in 
decision threshold (c) and discriminability (d’) were marginally correlated (r=.43, 
p=.07)). First, parameter estimates were tested for significant correlation with individual 
differences in Accountability’s effect on shifts in decision threshold (Accountable 
threshold (c) – Unaccountable threshold (c); controlling for shifts in discriminability 
(d’)). The difference in decision thresholds between the Accountable versus 
Unaccountable blocks indexes the degree to which participants’ decision thresholds 
became more conservative as a result of Accountability. Greater values indicate more 
conservative decision thresholds, or reduced over-claiming, as a function of 
Accountability. From an SDT perspective, participants with larger threshold difference 
values make fewer inflated claims of knowledge after being held Accountable because 
participants rely less liberally on easily accessible familiarity cues (i.e, much stronger 
evidence of familiarity is needed in order to claim knowledge).  
Second, parameter estimates were tested for significant correlation with individual 
differences in Accountability’s effect on shifts in discriminability (Accountable 
discriminability (d’) – Unaccountable discriminability (d’); controlling for shifts in 
decision threshold (c)). The difference in discriminability between the Accountable 
versus Unaccountable blocks indexes the degree to which Accountability affected the 
ability to discriminate existent from nonexistent items. Greater difference values indicate 
increased discriminability between existent and nonexistent items as a function of 
Accountability. From an SDT perspective, participants with larger discriminability 
difference values are better able to discriminate between existent and nonexistent items 
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after being held Accountable because they have a stronger sense of familiarity with 
existent items than nonexistent items. Finally, analyses involving parameter estimates 
from MPFC were conducted using the indices described above but used robust 
regression. One participant had outlying parameter estimate values in MPFC (i.e., more 
than 3 standard deviations away from the mean). Therefore, all individual difference 
analyses with MPFC used robust regression to down-weight the influence of the outlier. 
RESULTS 
Task Performance 
Decision thresholds became significantly more conservative and discriminability 
was significantly reduced as a function of accountability. Consistent with previous 
research (Paulhus et al., 2003), people made fewer inflated claims of knowledge after 
receiving an Accountability cue (see Table 2). Specifically, participants’ decision 
threshold (c) was significantly more conservative in the Accountable compared to the 
Unaccountable blocks (Accountable over-claiming: M = .91, SD = .25; Unaccountable 
over-claiming:  M = .79, SD = .28; t(17) = 2.46, p < .05). That is, participants’ decision 
threshold for claiming knowledge became more conservative (i.e., less inflated) after 
being cued that inflated claims of knowledge would be exposed.  
In addition, discriminability (d’) was significantly reduced in the Accountable 
versus Unaccountable blocks (t(17) = -2.60, p < .05). Although discriminability (d’) was 
reduced by Accountability, participants were able to differentiate existent from 
nonexistent items in both the Accountable (d’ M = 1.07, SD = .52) and Unaccountable 
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(d’ M = 1.44, SD = .54) blocks. Specifically, discriminability (d’) in the Accountable and 
Unaccountable blocks was significantly different from 0, the point at which there is no 
discriminability between existent and nonexistent items (Accountable: t(17) = 8.79, p< 
.05; Unaccountable: t(17) = 11.39, p< .05). Additionally, participants were not merely 
guessing along the 4-point rating scale. Hit rates were above chance-level (.25) in the 
Accountable (M= 0.38, SD= 0.14, t(17)= 3.81, p< .05) and Unaccountable (M= 0.48, 
SD= 0.16, t(17)= 5.81, p< .05) blocks. Lastly, Participants' raw familiarity ratings on 
average were significantly higher for real items compared fake items in both the 
Accountable (real items: M = 1.13, SD = .40; fake items: M = .23, SD = .19, t(17)= 8.65, 
p< .05) and Unaccountable (real items: M = 1.45, SD = .48; fake items: M = .18, SD = 
.17, t(17)= 10.93, p< .05) conditions. 
Finally, the effect of Accountability on the decision threshold (c) and 
discriminability (d’) was not merely the result of time spent on the task. No significant 
differences were found in reaction times for the Accountable versus Unaccountable 
blocks (Accountable RT: M = 1.22 sec, SD = .12 sec; Unaccountable RT: M = 1.18 sec, 








Table 2: Task performance in the Accountable and Unaccountable blocks. 
                          Accountable              Unaccountable  
   M SD  M SD  t(17) 
Decision threshold (c)  .91 .25  .79 .28  2.46* 
Discriminability (d’)  1.07 .52  1.44 .54  2.60*  
Hit rate (average)  .38 .14  .48 .16  -4.49*   
False alarm rate (average) .08 .05  .08 .05  .30 
Reaction time (seconds) 1.22  .12  1.18 .10  1.34  
(*) indicates p < .05. 
FMRI Results 
Conditions that reduce over-claiming responses are associated with increased OFC, 
MPFC, and dACC activation 
Consistent with previous research on positively-biased evaluation (Blackwood et 
al., 2003; Krusemark et al., 2008; Beer et al., 2010; Beer & Hughes, 2010; Hughes & 
Beer, in press-a), the current study on inflated claims of knowledge found that the main 
effect of Accountability was associated with increased activation in medial OFC (BA 11 
peak = -6, 58, -20), lateral OFC (right BA 47 peak = 32, 44, -18; left BA 47 peak = -30, 
56, -12), MPFC (BA 10 peak = -16, 64, -2; BA 9 peak = -2, 34, 62), and dACC (BA 24 
peak = -4, 14, 34) (see Table 3, Figure 13). Activity in these regions cannot be accounted 
for by reaction to the presentation of the Accountability cue in the Accountability blocks. 
The Accountable “Catch” block versus Unaccountable “Catch” block contrast did not 
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identify neural activation clusters in any of the a priori ROIs (see Table 4 for an 
additional whole brain analyses contrasting Accountable “Catch” blocks with 
Unaccountable “Catch” blocks). No significant activation clusters were found for the 
Unaccountable > Accountable blocks. 
Table 3: Neural regions associated with judgments in the Accountable versus 
Unaccountable contrast. 
     MNI Coordinates  
Region of Activation    BA  x y z T-stat     Cluster size 
Medial orbitofrontal (L)  11  -6 58 -20    6.62  226 
    -12 48 -18  6.31 
    -4 44 -24  5.05 
Lateral orbitofrontal (R)   47  32 44 -18  5.75  208 
    38 56 -16  4.59    
Lateral orbitofrontal (L)   47  -30 56 -12  6.96  717 
    -34 40 -18  6.88 
Medial prefrontal (L)      10  -16 64  -2    6.12  262 
         -10 70 10  5.58 
    0 68 18  4.88 
Medial prefrontal (L)     8/9  -2 34 62  4.96  235 
    0 56 44  4.80 
     0 60 32  3.96 
Dorsal anterior    
cingulate cortex (L)      24   -4 14 34   5.44  174 
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  0  6 26  4.06 
    0 -8 30  3.40 
BA = Brodmann’s Area; all regions are significant at P < .05 corrected for multiple 
comparisons at the cluster-level. 
 
 
Table 4: Neural regions associated with Accountable “Catch” Blocks versus 
Unaccountable “Catch” Blocks. 
     MNI Coordinates  
Region of Activation   BA  x y z T-stat     Cluster size 
Occipital (R)         18/19  26 -96  14  8.98  1294 
    32 -80  -6  6.02 
    24 -84  -6  5.81 
Occipital (L)  18  -18 -92  -8  7.09  1324 
    -28 -72 -10     6.83 
    -20 -78 -8  6.77 
Lateral prefrontal (R) 45  50 28  2    6.27  515 
    48 20  0  5.56 
    58 24 10  5.41 
Inferior parietal (L) 40  -58 -42 50  5.56  183 
     -56 -50 42  3.45 
BA = Brodmann’s Area; Cues did not significantly account for the activation seen in the 
experimental trials; no significant clusters were found in the planned ROI analyses. To 
illustrate that the catch blocks did elicit differences, whole brain analyses were 
conducted; all regions are significant at P < .05 corrected for multiple comparisons. 
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Figure 13: Neural activation defined by the Accountable versus Unaccountable contrast. 
Parameter estimates plotted in relation to baseline for each condition. (*) indicates p < 
.05. MOFC = medial orbitofrontal cortex; LOFC = left lateral orbitofrontal cortex; OFC = 
right lateral orbitofrontal cortex; MPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; dACC = dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex. 
 
Individual differences in shifts in decision threshold modulate MOFC 
Of all of the activation clusters found in a priori regions-of-interest for the main 
contrasts, only MOFC activation showed a significant positive association with shifts in 
decision threshold (c) as a function of Accountability (see Figure 14). Specifically, 
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activation in the MOFC region identified in the Accountable > Unaccountable contrast 
predicted the extent to which participants adopted a more conservative decision threshold 
as a function of Accountability (r= 0.52, p <.05, controlling for discriminability; see 
Figure 14). In other words, MOFC activation counteracted over-claiming responses by 
significantly predicting the extent to which participants shifted their decision threshold in 
a conservative manner across contexts. 
    
 
Figure 14: Individual differences in conservative decision threshold shifts (c) modulate 
MOFC activation.  
Scatterplot depicts individual differences in decision threshold shifts as a function of 
Accountability (Accountable decision threshold – Unaccountable decision threshold) in 
relation to parameter estimates from the MOFC activation identified in the Accountable > 
Unaccountable contrast. 
DISCUSSION 
Study 3 addresses the possibility that MOFC may support a common 
psychological process in positively-biased evaluation regardless of whether threat is 
explicitly heightened. The previous studies found robust evidence for an association 
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between MOFC function and positivity bias, but very little is understood about the 
psychological processes that account for this association. Study 3 provided a direct test of 
the hypothesis that MOFC may support a common psychological process in positivity 
bias by drawing on established behavioral methods that combine signal detection 
measurement of decision thresholds and a manipulation known to shift decision 
thresholds underlying positively-biased responses. Study 3 found evidence that MOFC 
activation supports shifts in decision thresholds that influence the expression of positivity 
bias in evaluations. Specifically, participants recruited more MOFC activation to the 
extent that they shifted their decision threshold in a more conservative (i.e., less 
positively-biased manner) when held accountable. This finding may explain why MOFC 
activation supported reduced positivity bias when threat was not explicitly heightened 
(Studies 1A and 1B) and increased positivity bias when threat was explicitly manipulated 
(Study 2). It may be that MOFC supports a common decision threshold shift function in 
positively-biased evaluation, but people may engage this psychological process 
differently depending on whether a self-protection motivation is especially heightened.  
While the findings from Study 3 are consistent with the possibility that MOFC 
supports a common mechanism in positively-biased evaluation, more research is needed 
to determine whether MOFC predicts both liberal and conservative shifts in decision 
thresholds in different contexts. In the current study, MOFC activation may have marked 
shifts in decision threshold that were conservative (rather than liberal) because 
accountability made participants more conservative about acting on their automatic 
tendency to construe weak familiarity cues as indicative of actual knowledge. People’s 
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inclination is to claim as much knowledge as possible because it casts the self in a 
flattering light and, therefore, use liberal thresholds for their familiarity judgments 
(Paulhus et al., 2003). However, accountability introduces a new context and decision 
threshold may be updated (that is, shifted) to balance the baseline tendency to claim as 
much knowledge as possible against the possibility of making the self look foolish if 
weakly held knowledge is a mistake. However, if the association between MOFC 
engagement and positively-biased responses reflects a departure from baseline strategies 
or components of self-judgment, then MOFC should predict both conservative and liberal 
shifts in decision threshold as long as they depart from baseline tendencies. This 
possibility is consistent with the findings from Study 2, in which MOFC activation 
predicted increases in positively-biased self-evaluations. The increased MOFC activation 
may have reflected a shift towards more liberal decision thresholds for expressing 
positive information about the self as a way to cope with threat. However, more research 
is needed to directly test whether MOFC activation in positively-biased evaluation also 
predicts liberal shifts in the decision thresholds for expressing baseline positively-biased 
associations. The accountability and overclaiming paradigm used in the current study is 
not suitable for testing this hypothesis because it primarily elicits one combination of 
decision threshold shift and change in positively-biased responses (Sedikides et al., 2002; 
Paulhus et al., 2003). One possibility is to examine decision threshold shifts in an 
overclaiming paradigm in which participants are instructed to make a good impression on 
others by appearing especially intelligent (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2003) or by providing 
participants with threatening feedback about their intelligence (e.g., Schmeichel & 
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Demaree, 2010). In these cases, MOFC activation may predict more liberal shifts in 
decision thresholds and increased positivity bias. 
Another important direction for understanding the neural underpinnings of 
positivity bias is to understand why lateral OFC, dACC and MPFC tend to show 
differential activation in relation to conditions of positively-biased evaluation but do not 
always significantly predict individual differences in positively-biased evaluation (see 
Beer & Hughes, 2010; Hughes & Beer, in press-a; Krusemark et al., 2008). Research in 
other domains has associated many of these neural regions with difficulty or conflict 
(e.g., Beer, Shimamura, & Knight, 2004; Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004; Grinband et 
al., 2011) yet that account does not readily fit with the existing research on positivity 
bias. For example, if conditions that exacerbate or attenuate positivity bias were simply 
more difficult or required more effort to resolve some kind of conflict, it would be 
reasonable to expect that these conditions would be associated with longer reaction times. 
However, that is not the case in the current study or in previous research (e.g., Hughes & 
Beer, in press-a; Hughes & Beer, forthcoming). In the current study, difficulty might also 
be indexed by how difficult it was for participants to discriminate between existent and 
nonexistent items (d’). Yet activation found in the lateral OFC, dACC, and MPFC did not 
show significant correlations with the discriminability measure. Future research is needed 
to more directly target the function of these regions in relation to conditions that attenuate 
positivity bias. 
Finally, a limitation of Study 3 is that the within subjects nature of the 
accountability manipulation may have not allowed for an increased number of blocks, 
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which may have lead to decreased statistical power. While the blocked nature of the task 
may have partially alleviated power issues related to the within subjects accountability 
manipulation, it does not discount the possibility that lateral OFC, dACC, and MPFC 
may have also predicted individual differences in decision threshold shifts or 
discriminability. In addition, the MOFC activation is theorized to mark a ‘set shift’ in 
decision threshold with a signal that is sustained within a context (rather than transient 
signal elicited in a trial-by-trial manner). However, the blocked design in the present 
work makes it impossible to tease apart activation that represents tonic activation for each 
block from activation that reflects trial-by-trial changes. Therefore, future research using 
a mixed blocked, event-related design is needed to test these two alternate accounts 




Overview of Findings 
The work presented in this dissertation represents a first step toward examining 
the neural mechanisms that underlie positivity biases in order to inform our 
understanding of how positivity biases are accomplished as a function of different 
motivational contexts. Previous behavioral research is limited in its ability to resolve how 
positivity bias occurs in different contexts because behavioral indices of positivity bias 
are similar in both threatening and non-threatening contexts. We used an interdisciplinary 
approach that combined established experimental methods and theory from social 
psychology, decision-making, and neuroscience in an attempt to peer underneath the 
hood of positivity bias in different motivational contexts. Specifically, the four 
experiments presented here aimed to (1) identify a core network of neural regions that is 
associated with positivity bias (Studies 1A and 1B), (2) examine how a heightened self-
protection motivation elicited by threat changes the engagement of that core network of 
neural regions (Study 2), and (3) begin to test the specific mechanisms that may be 
instantiated in those regions (Study 3). In doing so, this body of work begins to establish 
a strong empirical foundation for the neural systems of positivity biases in evaluations 
and sets the stage for future work aimed at uncovering the specific mechanisms 
instantiated in those systems as well as how those systems may interact.  
The first pair of experiments sought to identify a core set of neural regions that 
underlie positivity biases (Studies 1A and 1B). In particular, these studies used functional 
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magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural systems involved in a commonly used 
indicator of positivity bias, namely, the better-than-average effect. We found evidence for 
a core set of neural regions comprised of the OFC and, to a lesser extent dACC that was 
negatively modulated by better-than-average judgments. These findings contribute to a 
large body of neural research on self-evaluation and social cognition by identifying for 
the first time a core network of neural regions involved in positivity biases in self-
evaluation and social cognition.  
Study 2 extended this line of research by explicitly heightening a self-protection 
motivation and examining its effect on the core network of neural regions that underlie 
positively-biased evaluation. Interestingly, Study 2 demonstrated that explicit threat 
changed the engagement of the neural systems associated with positivity bias as well as 
engaged additional neural modulation. In particular, positively-biased evaluations in 
response to threatening feedback were associated with increased activation in a common 
set of regions comprised of MOFC, LOFC, and MPFC, with the additional recruitment of 
increased amygdala and insula activation. Furthermore, MOFC and MPFC activation 
predicted individual differences in increased positivity bias as a function of threat. The 
different pattern of activation in an overlapping set of regions and additional neural 
modulation as a function of threat represents a first step toward understanding whether 
positively-biased evaluations engage distinct psychological processes as a function of 
self-protection. However, more research is needed to better understand whether the 
neural findings suggest the presence of common or distinct mechanisms in positively-
biased evaluation as a function of a heightened self-protection motivation. In particular, 
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the MOFC appears to be a critical region in positively-biased judgment that shows 
opposite patterns of activation as a function of threat across studies.  
Study 3 tested the specific hypothesis that MOFC supports a common mechanism 
in positively-biased judgment by drawing on signal detection techniques to model 
decision threshold shifts that may underlie positively-biased responses. Study 3 found 
evidence that MOFC activation supports shifts in decision thresholds that influence the 
expression of positively-biased responses as a function of the motivational context. This 
finding suggests that MOFC may be a convergence zone for positively-biased judgment 
in the brain and helps explain why MOFC activation leads to reduced positivity bias 
when self-protection is not especially heightened and increased positivity bias when self-
protection is heightened. Specifically, MOFC may support a common mechanism in 
positivity bias, but the common mechanism may be implemented differently as a function 
of the motivational context. For example, people may implement the common 
mechanism differently as a way to increase positively-biased evaluations in the context of 
explicit threat. If people implement a common mechanism in different ways as a function 
of the motivational context (e.g., self-protection), then this finding may provide some 
preliminary evidence that positivity biases may reflect distinct phenomena as a function 
of self-protection motivation.  
Taken together, these studies represent a first step toward developing neural 
models of positively-biased judgment in order move away from underspecified 
behavioral comparisons and begin to understand how positivity biases are accomplished 
in different motivational contexts. Specifically, the studies provide evidence that (1) 
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MOFC may be a convergence zone for positively-bias judgment that supports a common 
decision process that is implemented differently as a function of the motivational context, 
(2) MPFC may play a distinct role in compensating for threat by increasing positivity 
bias, and (3) Amygdala and Insula may be involved in positivity bias in the context of 
threat, but their role remains underdetermined. The role of each of these neural regions 
and their implications for whether positivity bias reflects multiple processes depending 
on contextual motivators can be informed by a consideration of their neuroanatomy and 
the functions they may support. 
Role of Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex in Positivity Bias 
NEUROANATOMY OF THE MOFC 
The neuroanatomy of MOFC is consistent with the present proposal that the 
MOFC may support a decision process in positivity bias that is sensitive to motivational 
contexts. The MOFC is relatively unique among regions of the cortex because it is 
densely interconnected with structures involved in affective processing, higher-level 
cognition, and autonomic regulation (for review see Price & Drevets, 2010). Evidence for 
affective input comes from MOFC’s interconnection with the amygdala and ventral 
striatum, two structures important for emotional and reinforcement learning, and from 
MOFC’s interconnection with the thalamus, a structure that receives excitatory and 
inhibitory inputs from amygdala and basal ganglia (Amaral & Price, 1984; Cavada et al., 
2000; Price & Drevets, 2010). These cortico-striato-pallido-thalamic loops are important 
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for maintaining a course of action and for switching to a new course of action when 
previously advantageous behaviors become disadvantageous (Price & Drevets, 2010). 
Evidence for higher-level cognitive inputs come from MOFC’s interconnection with 
other cortical areas, including the lateral OFC (LOFC BA 47) region involved in 
processing hedonic aspects of sensory information (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; 
Schoenbaum et al., 2011), dorsolateral prefrontal regions involved in goal formation and 
maintenance (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Fuster, 2001), and MPFC regions important for 
attending to internally generated information (BA 10 and 9, see MPFC section below). 
Lastly, evidence for autonomic control comes from MOFC’s outputs to the 
hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray (PAG), and other regions important for regulating 
autonomic activity and preparing the body for action (Ongur & Price, 2000; Price & 
Drevets, 2010). The pattern of connectivity suggests that MOFC may be uniquely 
positioned to integrate basic affective, reinforcing, and interoceptive signals, higher-level 
cognitive representations, and goals in order to flexibly guide decision-making 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012; Wallis, 2007).  
FUNCTIONS OF THE MOFC 
As suggested by its neuroanatomy, MOFC function is not limited to positively-
biased judgment, but rather plays a more general role in flexible and goal-directed 
decision-making (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). Some of the earliest hints of the role 
of MOFC in decision-making come from clinical case studies showing that patients with 
OFC damage exhibit fundamental impairments in decision-making (Lhermitte, 1986; 
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Rolls et al., 1994; Stuss & Benson, 1984). In particular, damage to the OFC, including 
the MOFC, is classically associated with the inflexible expression of prepotent or 
automatic tendencies even when they become contextually inappropriate (Bechara et al., 
2000; Beer et al., 2006; Fellows & Farah, 2003; Lhermitte, 1986; Rolls et al., 1994; Stuss 
& Benson, 1984; Sellitto et al., 2011). Patients with OFC damage are able to state the 
rules that govern a task, but then fail to apply those rules to their behavior. For example, 
even though patients are aware of the different rules that govern interactions with 
strangers versus close friends, patients still talk to strangers as though they are close 
friends (Beer et al., 2006). 
The classic observation that patients with OFC damage are impaired in their 
ability to flexibly adjust behavior raises the possibility that MOFC may play a role in 
certain aspects of reinforcement learning. Flexible decision-making requires the ability to 
estimate the values of actions based on previous experience and subsequently decide 
between them. Reinforcement learning models are used to examine how this process is 
underpinned in the brain (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In this formalism, when an action yields 
more or less reward than expected, the action-value estimate is updated to guide future 
decisions. MOFC lesions in humans and other species have been shown to impair the 
ability to update the decision-making policy when contingencies change and previously 
successful strategies are no longer advantageous (e.g., reversal learning and fear 
extinction: Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows & Farah, 2003; 
Izquierdo et al., 2004; Milad & Quirk, 2002; Jones & Mishkin, 1972). Similarly, a 
number of fMRI studies in healthy individuals find evidence that MOFC activation is 
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involved in tracking changes in the reward contingency between actions and outcomes, 
which is necessary to flexibly update behavior (Behrens et al., 2008; Daw et al., 2006; 
Glascher et al., 2009; Hampton et al., 2006; Tanaka et al., 2008; Valentin et al., 2007). In 
addition, the burgeoning literature on “model-based” reinforcement learning – a more 
sophisticated form of choice that utilizes the structure of the environment – suggests that 
the MOFC may be involved in evaluating and updating internal representations of the 
structure of the structure of the environment in order to flexibly guide decisions (Daw et 
al., 2011; Hampton et al., 2006; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008; Takahashi et al., 2011). 
However, it is not known if the decision processes supported by MOFC in reinforcement 
learning are sensitive to changes in motivational contexts as in the present work, since 
previous research has not examined reinforcement learning processes as a function of 
different contextual motivators.  
While the reinforcement learning literature has not manipulated motivational 
contexts, research on goal-directed decision-making shows that MOFC is sensitive to 
changes in motivational contexts. For example, there is evidence that the association 
between MOFC activation and the value of a stimulus is modulated by subjective 
preferences (e.g., Pepsi vs. Coke) and contextual factors (e.g., wines labeled as expensive 
vs. inexpensive)(Arana et al., 2003; de Araujo et al., 2005; Fellows & Farah 2007; 
McCabe et al., 2008; McClure et al., 2004; Plassmann et al., 2008), changes in the 
motivational significance of a stimulus (e.g., chocolate) as a function of satiety (Gottfried 
et al., 2003; Kringelbach et al., 2003; Small et al., 2001; Valentin et al., 2007), and 
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changes in the motivational significance of options after integrating higher-order versus 
prepotent goals (e.g., be healthy vs. eat tasty: Bhanji & Beer, in press; Hare et al., 2011).  
The present findings extend research on the decision processes supported by 
MOFC by conceptualizing a role for this region in biased social judgment as a function of 
contextual motivators. One interpretation of the present findings is that MOFC may 
support a common decision process in positively-biased judgment, namely, decision 
threshold shifts that are implemented differently as a function of the motivational context. 
Consistent with previous research, the present findings suggest that the MOFC is not tied 
to the particular outcome of positively-biased evaluation, but rather that the MOFC is 
sensitive to the motivational significance of social decisions. In the context of threat, 
MOFC may predict liberal decision threshold shifts that increase positively-biased 
responses because these responses may be a valuable way to protect the self (Study 2). 
However, when threat is not explicitly heightened, MOFC may be sensitive to contextual 
factors such as restricted trait breadth that elicit conservative shifts that reduce the 
expression of positively-biased responses (Studies 1A and 1B). This interpretation 
parallels research showing that MOFC influences the way evidence for a perceptual 
judgment is evaluated as a function of motivational contexts that bias those judgments 
(Basten et al., 2010; Mulder et al., 2012; Scheibe et al., 2010; Summerfield & Koechlin, 
2008, 2010). Research in perceptual decision-making characterizes bias as shifts in the 
starting point in the accumulation of evidence that favors a decision (Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008), and there is evidence that MOFC is sensitive to those shifts in starting points 
(Mulder et al., 2012; Scheibe et al., 2010).  
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While we are proposing that MOFC may support a common decision threshold 
shift function that is implemented differently depending on the motivational context, the 
present work cannot discount the possibility that MOFC supports different processes in 
different motivational contexts. For example, it may be that the same MOFC region 
supports one mechanism when threat is not explicitly heightened, and a different 
mechanism in the context of explicit threat, because self-evaluation motivations were not 
manipulated within the same participants. In order to directly associate MOFC activation 
with a common mechanism that up-regulates and down-regulates positively-biased 
responses as a function of motivational contexts, it will be important for future research 
to manipulate self-evaluation motivations within the same participants. For example, does 
MOFC predict accurate or consistent self-evaluations as well as positively-biased 
evaluations to the extent that people are motivated to achieve those outcomes in their 
self-evaluations (e.g., Brown, 2012; Trope, 1986; Swann, 1983; Sedikides et al., 2007)? 
Answering these questions has the potential to further constrain our understanding of 
whether positivity biases reflect multiple processes as a function of motivational contexts. 
Although the present research suggests that MOFC may shift decision thresholds 
away from baseline positively-biased starting points as a function of the motivational 
context, questions remain about whether these baseline starting points exist, where in the 
brain they are represented, and how they may be updated as a function of different 
motivations. As mentioned above, there is evidence to suggest that positivity bias is 
prepotent or at least relies on relatively automatized processing (Alicke et al., 1995; Beer 
& Hughes, 2010; Beer, Chester, & Hughes, forthcoming; Hixon & Swann, 1983; Hughes 
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& Beer, unpublished data; Koole et al., 2001; Lench & Ditto, 2008; Paulhus et al., 1989; 
Swann et al., 1990). One avenue to test the presence of prepotent or baseline positively-
biased starting points is to examine populations that decouple the direction of decision 
threshold shift and the direction of its impact on the expression of positively-biased 
responses. For example, people with depressed or low self-esteem tend to have baseline 
associations with self that are negative rather than positive (e.g., Koole et al., 2001; 
Swann & Read, 1981 and see Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010 for a review) and can 
respond to self-esteem threats with increased self-deprecation (e.g., Vohs & Heatherton, 
2004 and see vanDellen et al., 2011 for a review). In these populations, MOFC 
engagement may predict the combination of a shift towards a more liberal threshold 
underlying an increase in responses that are negatively-biased (rather than positively-
biased) as a function of explicitly heightened threat.  
Another avenue to begin to examine baseline positively-biased starting points 
may be to apply computational modeling techniques that provide measures that 
approximate these baseline starting points in self-evaluation. For example, “model based” 
reinforcement learning and Bayesian analysis provide a way to approximate internal 
models and prior beliefs that bias behavior, which may serve as proxies for baseline 
starting points in self-evaluation (e.g., Daw et al., 2011; Griffiths et al., 2010; Hampton et 
al., 2006). Bayesian models dictate how agents should update their beliefs in light of new 
information and the strength of the prior knowledge possessed by the agent. The extent to 
which people update or are resistant to updating these prior beliefs given new information 
may provide a method for measuring baseline starting points and their relation to the 
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neurobiology of positively-biased judgment. Similarly, drift diffusion models permit the 
measurement of shifts in starting points in evidence accumulation that may bias decisions 
(Mulder et al., 2012; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). The relation between variability in 
individuals’ starting points and shifts in positively-biased responses as a function of the 
motivational context may provide additional insight into the existence of baseline starting 
points in positivity bias. 
Role of Medial Prefrontal Cortex in Positivity Bias 
While the MOFC may support a common mechanism in positively-biased 
judgment that is implemented differently as a function of the motivational context, the 
MPFC may support a distinct mechanism or a distinct neural interaction as a function of a 
heightened self-protection motivation. A consideration of the neuroanatomy and 
functions associated with MPFC may be useful to inform its role in positively-biased 
judgment. 
NEUROANATOMY OF THE MPFC 
The neuroanatomy of MPFC suggests possibilities about its interaction with 
neural regions related to positivity biases as well as the potential mechanisms it might 
support in positively-biased judgment. The MPFC, consisting of Bodmann areas 9 and 
10, is neuroanatomically distinct from the MOFC region in BA 11 described above 
(Ongur & Price, 2000; Price & Drevets, 2010). First, the MPFC (BA 9 and 10) is robustly 
interconnected with other medial prefrontal cortical areas, such as the MOFC (BA 
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11)(Barbas et al., 1999; Price & Drevets, 2010). Second, evidence for memory-related 
input into the MPFC is suggested by its interconnection with memory-related regions 
such as the entorhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, hippocampal formation, posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), and lateral parietal lobe (Barbas et al., 1999; Price & Drevets, 
2010). In fact, the MPFC and memory-related regions listed above form part of the 
default mode network of brain regions that are functionally as well as anatomically 
connected (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Vincent et al., 2006). These default mode 
regions are active at rest and during tasks that encourage an internal focus of attention 
and exhibit a pattern of deactivation during certain goal-directed behaviors, potentially to 
suspend attention to internal information that may interfere with attention to the external 
environment (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). One possibility is 
that the MPFC, via its interaction with the default mode network, may support access to 
internal information necessary for positivity biases in self-evaluations in the context of 
threat, and the MOFC, via its interaction with the MPFC, may modulate the expression of 
the accessed information. A more specific consideration of the distinct mechanism that 
may be supported by MPFC in positively-biased judgment is discussed below in relation 
to psychological processes associated with MPFC function.  
FUNCTIONS OF THE MPFC 
The MPFC is consistently recruited in a variety of tasks that require accessing 
internal representations of self as compared to a variety of semantic control conditions 
(e.g., Craik et al., 1999; Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 
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2002). Previous research shows that MPFC activation is recruited when people evaluate 
the self-descriptiveness and certainty of personality traits (D’Argembeau et al., 2012; 
Fossati et al., 2003; Macrae et al., 2004; Moran et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005), 
evaluate their preferences and attitudes (Cunningham et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2008; 
Mitchell et al., 2006; Zysset et al., 2002), evaluate or monitor their task performance 
(Beer et al., 2010; Bengtsson, et al., 2009), and evaluate their personality across time 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2008, 2009; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009; Tamir & Mitchell, 
2011). Consistent with its relation to a network of memory-related regions, MPFC 
activation predicts subsequent memory for information that was processed in a self-
referential manner (Macrae et al., 2004), and MPFC is engaged during the retrieval of 
information that was encoded in a self-referential manner (Fossati et al., 2004; Benoit et 
al., 2010). Taken together, evidence suggests that the MPFC is important for accessing 
and representing aspects of the self.  
The relation between MPFC and self-processing is potentially due to its broader 
role in accessing and representing internally generated information in general, which 
encompasses self-information (Burgess et al., 2007; Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Christoff 
et al., 2004; Passingham et al., 2009). For example, MPFC activation is recruited by a 
number of disparate tasks that all require representations of internally generated 
information, such as recalling autobiographical memories (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), imagining future situations (self-projection: Buckner 
& Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007), 
engaging in spatial navigation (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007), mind-wandering and 
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stimulus-independent thought (Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007), and thinking 
about other people (mentalizing: Blakemore et al., 2004; Harris et al. 2005; Krienen et al., 
2010; Mitchell et al., 2006). The role of MPFC in accessing internally generated 
information is consistent with the observation that MPFC is part of the default mode 
network discussed above that is active at rest and during tasks that encourage attention to 
internally generated thoughts and feelings that may be necessary to form mental 
representations of self (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schachter 
et al., 2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2008). Taken together, these empirical observations 
support the notion that MPFC plays a role in internal representations of information about 
the self, and this process may play a distinct role in positively-biased evaluations in the 
context of threat.  
The findings from the present set of studies contribute to this large literature on 
MPFC function and to ongoing discussions about how MPFC and MOFC may play 
distinct roles in self-processing and positivity biases in self-evaluation (e.g., Beer, 2007; 
D'Argembeau et al., 2012; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Ochsner et al., 2005). One 
possibility is that the MPFC may support access to more certain aspects of self while the 
MOFC evaluates whether the accessed information should be expressed in judgment 
based on contextual or motivational goals. People respond to threat by drawing on 
portions of their mental representations of self in addition to or instead of emotion-
regulation processes such as inhibition or reappraisal of the threat stimulus itself 
(Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Wood et al., 1999). In particular, people respond to 
threatening feedback by accessing core aspects of their self-concept (Aronson et al., 
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1995; Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Steele et al., 1993; vanDellen et al., 2011; Wood et al., 
1999) and increase their influence on subsequent self-evaluations to the extent that they 
find it believable or defensible (Kunda, 1990; Sedikides et al., 2002). This possibility is 
consistent with the research described above that posits a role for MPFC in mental 
representations of self, as well as recent research demonstrating that MPFC differentiates 
self-judgments of personality that are more certain from those that are more uncertain 
(D'Argembeau et al., 2012). MPFC modulation of certainty about self-judgment may 
reflect a relation between certainty and the extent to which relevant introspective 
information is accessible or represented. Therefore, MPFC’s role in accessing certainly 
held aspects of the self-concept might be particularly important in the context of threat. 
However, it remains unknown whether MPFC activation reflects access to core aspects of 
the self when threat is explicitly heightened, and whether these core aspects increase 
positivity bias in self-evaluations. Studies that examine evaluations of core and non-core 
aspects of self under conditions that vary in the extent to which threat is explicitly 
heightened may begin to address this possibility.   
The expression of self-information accessed by the MPFC may be influenced by 
decision threshold shifts supported by MOFC activation, a possibility that is consistent 
with the neuroanatomical connectivity between MPFC and MOFC. This perspective may 
explain why MOFC activation differentiates judgments about traits that are deemed 
important to possess compared to traits deemed unimportant to possess (D'Argembeau et 
al., 2012). Behavioral research shows that people use more liberal definitions when 
judging traits they wished they possessed and these liberal definitions are associated with 
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increased judgments of trait self-descriptiveness (e.g., Dunning, 1995; Suls, 1999). In the 
context of threat, MOFC activation may shift decision thresholds in order to liberally 
define traits in ways that allow the self to appear special in order to compensate for the 
threat. While this suggestion is consistent with the MPFC and MOFC connectivity 
described above (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Barbas et al., 1999; Price & Drevets, 2010), 
more research is needed to fully understand whether MOFC is a region that modulates the 
expression of self-representations mediated by MPFC function. 
Role of Amygdala and Insula in Positivity Bias 
While the roles of the amygdala and insula in positivity bias remain 
underdetermined, one possibility is that amygdala and insula may project important 
affective signals to the MOFC and MPFC in the context of explicit threat. A host of 
research and recent meta-analyses have shown that the amygdala and insula are important 
structures for processing the affective properties of information, and emotion’s influence 
on cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and decision-making (Kober et al., 
2008; Phan et al., 2002; Phelps, 2006; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). The 
amygdala is believed to play a role in processing motivationally relevant stimuli as a 
function of the situation (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Cunningham et al., 2008; Pessoa et 
al., 2006; Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008), which may explain the classic association 
between amygdala activation and threat-related processing (LeDoux, 2000; Whalen, 
1998). For example, the processing goals of an observer or the chronic motivational 
styles that observers use to deal with affective information (e.g., neuroticism) modulate 
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whether amygdala signals rewarding information, threatening information, or both 
(Cunningham et al., 2008, 2010). Therefore, the amygdala may signal information that is 
motivationally relevant as a function of the situation, and modulate attention, memory, 
and decision-making to deal with motivationally salient events.  
Similarly, the insula is similarly implicated in affective processing (Nitschke et 
al., 2006; Ploghaus et al., 1999; Phan et al., 2002; Kober et al., 2008), with increased 
insular sensitivity to affective information in individuals with high trait anxiety and 
anxiety disorders (Etkin & Wager, 2007; Stein et al., 2007). Recent evidence suggests 
that the insula may continuously monitor threat levels in the environment, with anxious 
individuals showing increased insula activation during threat monitoring (Somerville, 
Whalen, & Kelley, 2010b). Moreover, the insula is important for representing the visceral 
feeling states associated with emotional experiences (Craig, 2002; Singer et al., 2009; 
Critchley, 2005). For example, insula activity is associated with receiving unfair offers 
and subsequently rejecting those unfair offers (Sanfey et al., 2003), and with the 
experience of social pain and empathy during social interaction tasks (Eisenberger et al., 
2003, 2011; Hein et al., 2010; Kross et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2006). Therefore, by 
representing current feeling states, the insula may serve as a benchmark for interactions 
with the environment (Critchley, 2005).  
Taken together, previous research is consistent with the hypothesis that amygdala 
and insula may project current motivational and affective signals to the MOFC and 
MPFC in order to guide the access and evaluation of self-related information in order to 
compensate for threat. This hypothesis is supported by evidence that both amygdala and 
 108 
insula are interconnected with the MOFC (Cavada et al., 2000; Ongur & Price, 2000). 
The connectivity between these regions and the MOFC are important for emotional and 
reinforcement learning (Baxter & Murray, 2002; Hampton et al., 2007; Holland & 
Gallagher, 2004; Milad & Quirk, 2002; Phelps et al., 2004) and their interactions with the 
hippocampus, a memory region that is interconnected with both MPFC and MOFC, have 
been shown to modulate emotional and autobiographical memory (Adolphs et al., 2005; 
Dolcos et al., 2005; Sharot et al., 2007b). While amygdala and insula activation did not 
predict increases in positively-biased responses as a function of threat (Study 2), 
activation in these regions might modulate activity in MOFC or MPFC regions associated 
with positively-biased responses as a function of threat. Therefore, future research may 
find distinct connectivity patterns between amygdala, insula and medial cortical regions 
as a function of threat.  
A second possibility is that amygdala and insula are related to within-subject 
variability in positively-biased responses, rather than between-subject variability as 
measured in the present work. For example, amygdala and insula activation are often 
associated with processing affective information and feeling states in a continuous trial-
by-trial within-subjects manner (e.g., Canli et al., 2000; Somerville et al., 2010b). 
Therefore, future studies that use tasks that allow for a trial-by-trial mapping of amygdala 
and insula activation and positively-biased responses as a function of threat may uncover 
an association between amygdala and insula activation and within-subject variability in 
positivity bias as a function of threat.  
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Limitations 
 One primary limitation of the present work is the heavy focus on better-than-
average judgments as the operationalization of positivity bias (Studies 1A, 1B, and 2). 
Better-than-average judgments were chosen as a primary operationalization of positivity 
bias for theoretically motivated reasons. As mentioned above, some researchers have 
questioned whether positivity biases reflect a self-protection motivation because of a 
relative lack of demonstrations that threat increases better-than-average responses 
(Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; but see Brown, 2012; Vohs & Heatherton, 2004). 
Therefore, examining the neural mechanisms of better-than-average responses in 
situations with threat and without heightened threat was particularly useful to determine 
whether positivity biases reflect a single phenomenon or multiple distinct phenomena as a 
function of motivational context. However, recent research has called into question the 
extent to which better-than-average judgments reflect a biased judgment or a self-serving 
judgment (Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi, 1999; also see Chambers & Windschitl, 
2004). First, research has shown that when people are asked to evaluate how happy they 
are compared to others in their peer group, people base their social comparative 
judgments largely on their own level of happiness. Specifically, social comparative 
judgments of happiness were strongly related to absolute judgments of one’s own 
happiness, but unrelated to absolute judgments of other people’s happiness (Klar & 
Giladi, 1999). Therefore, the definition of positivity bias in social comparisons as the 
degree of deviation from the average peer may reflect a self-evaluation without 
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consideration of the referent group, which suggests that better-than-average judgments 
may be a problematic measure of a positivity bias. Second, research has shown that 
people evaluate randomly selected individuals of a group (even nonsocial objects such as 
soaps and songs) more favorably than other members of that group (Klar & Giladi, 1997; 
Giladi & Klar, 2002). The arbitrary nature of the selection of the target for comparison 
raises the possibility that better-than-average judgments reflect a non-selective 
superiority bias rather than a more specific self-serving positivity bias. Giladi and Klar 
(2002) present a local-comparisons-general-standards (LOGE) approach to explain the 
better-than-average effect. Specifically, the LOGE approach posits that when people 
compare one target member of a group to other members of that group, people fail to use 
appropriate standards specific to the comparison group and instead use more general 
standards involving members from outside the comparison group. Therefore, better-than-
average biases may represent a more general class of judgment biases that are not self-
specific. It is important to note that Study 3 and previous research (Beer et al., 2006; Beer 
et al., 2010; Krusemark et al., 2008) used very different operationalizations of positivity 
bias (e.g., overclaiming bias, overconfidence bias) and different manipulations to 
generate variance in positively-biased responses and found convergent evidence for the 
involvement of a core set of neural regions (OFC, MPFC, dACC). Future studies should 
use a variety of methods to operationalize positivity bias in order to find convergent 
evidence for the neural associations of positivity bias in self-evaluations.  
Second, while the better-than-average task and behavioral manipulations used in 
the present research provide a measure of between-subject differences in positivity bias, 
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they are limited in their ability to provide trial-by-trial, or within-subject differences in 
positivity bias. First, the better-than-average effect does not provide a measure of 
positivity bias at the trial level of analysis: At the trial level, it is impossible to tell apart 
individuals who make positively-biased evaluations from those that are exceptional on 
that trait. Second, the threat and accountability manipulations provide measures of shifts 
in positively-biased evaluations as a function of motivational contexts between blocks, 
but do not provide a way to examine the neural regions that may be linked to positively-
biased responses at the trial level of analysis. Therefore, the amygdala, insula, and other 
regions that were engaged in conditions of positively-biased evaluation but were not 
modulated by between-subject variability in positively-biased evaluation may be 
modulating behavioral responses at the trial level of analysis. One previous study 
included a trial-by-trial measure of bias (overconfidence in task performance) and found 
convergent evidence that MOFC tracks trial-by-trial variability in confidence estimates 
(Beer et al., 2010). Future research that examines positivity bias on a trial-by-trial basis 
may be helpful for providing convergent evidence for the proposed neural model of 
positively-biased judgment as well as help extend the neural model by incorporating 
relationships that might have been missed with the current approach (e.g., Beer et al., 
2010).  
A final limitation is that the behavioral manipulations used may have contributed 
to decreased statistical power. For example, extensive pilot testing revealed that the threat 
manipulation used in Study 2 might have a diminished effect on people’s behavioral 
responses after too many exposures to the threatening feedback. This limited the number 
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of blocks that could be successfully implemented in the fMRI study. While the blocked 
nature of the task may partially alleviate the decreased statistical power associated with a 
limited number of repetitions, it does not discount the possibility that explicit threat may 
have engaged additional neural regions that we did not have the power to detect. In 
addition, neural regions that were associated with positively-biased evaluations in some 
but not all of the studies, such as LOFC (Studies 1A and 1B), MPFC (Study 2), and 
dACC (Study 1A), may support common mechanisms across different motivational 
contexts much like MOFC, but they were not detected across all studies due to lack of 
power. Therefore, future research that examines the mechanisms supported by additional 
neural regions associated with positivity bias will help shed light on whether positivity 
biases reflect multiple distinct processes as a function of whether self-protection 




How do people make positively-biased evaluations of their personality, 
knowledge, and behavior in different contexts? Do positively-biased evaluations 
represent a single phenomenon or multiple distinct phenomena depending on contextual 
motivators? The experiments presented here attempt to deepen our understanding of how 
positively-biased evaluations occur as a function of different motivational contexts. 
Peering inside the brain to understand the neural underpinnings of positivity biases and 
how these neural systems are influenced by different motivations has the potential to 
inform our understanding of how positively-biased evaluations are accomplished, a 
question that has been problematic to address with behavioral measures alone. On a 
broader level, understanding how positivity biases occur could have far reaching real-
world implications. For example, a deeper understanding of how positivity biases occur 
may be helpful for providing methods to adjust some of the documented maladaptive 
effects of positivity biases on health behaviors, educational outcomes, and in the work 
place (Dunning et al., 2004). Similarly, future research along these lines may shed new 
light on why different forms of flawed self-evaluation arise in clinical populations 
characterized by neurological impairments. For example, mood disorders and substance 
abuse are associated with impairments in medial cortical areas and anatomically related 
limbic structures (Price & Drevets, 2010; Volkow et al., 1991) and are characterized by 
impaired self-insight (Aleman et al., 2006; Alloy & Ahrens, 1987). Understanding the 
relationship between neural impairment and flawed self-assessment may facilitate the 
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development of interventional therapies by pinpointing the processes and patients who 
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